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I. BACKGROUND
Recognizing the need for clearer standards regarding the degree of deference
that the federal courts should confer on guidance issued by the Department of
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service, the Tax Section, under the direction
of former ABA Section of Taxation Chair Pamela F. Olson, created a Task
Force on Judicial Deference in 2000. It was charged with the mission of not only
examining the state of the law pertaining to judicial deference across the broad
range of administrative pronouncements issued by the Treasury and the IRS, but
also sharing its conclusions and possible solutions with the Section of Taxation
and the profession at large. Based on the agency-by-agency approach required
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218
(2001), the Task Force analyzed the differences in the degree of authority and
degree of deliberation underlying the various forms of such guidance and the
impact of those differences on whether, and to what degree, judicial deference is
appropriate.
In January 2004, the Task Force presented a draft Report to the Tax Section
Council. Comments were received from the following Section Committees during the drafting process: Administrative Practice, Affiliated and Related Corporations, Closely Held Businesses, Corporate Tax, Court Procedure and Practice,
Employee Benefits, Exempt Organizations, Foreign Activities of U.S. Taxpayers, Individual Income Tax, and Standards of Tax Practice.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Task Force recognizes that in light of Mead, which emphasized "the great
variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government's administrative arms
with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to Acts
of Congress," id. at 235-36, there is a need for an agency-by-agency consideration of the extent to which courts should give deference to administrative
pronouncements under the mandate of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), which instructs a reviewing court to accept certain administrative interpretations rather than to impose its own interpretations
when Congress has not spoken to the precise question at issue.
The Task Force also recognizes that post-Mead, there is a great deal of confusion regarding the application of Chevron and a particular need to develop a
clear set of deference concepts for interpretations of the tax law because of, inter
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alia: (1) the power and pervasiveness of the IRS, (2) the large number and
variety of administrative pronouncements issued by the IRS, and (3) the
Supreme Court's continuing reliance in its tax cases on the traditional test of
National Muffler Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1978), rather than
on Chevron.
The recommendations of the Task Force can be summarized as follows:
1. Federal courts should give Chevron deference to regulations promulgated
by the Treasury and the IRS, with (i) legislative tax regulations receiving
controlling deference under Chevron so long as they are not arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute, and (ii) interpretive tax
regulations receiving the same controlling deference if they are reasonable
under the test of National Muffler, which examines such factors as the
extent to which the regulation harmonizes with the plain language, origin,
and purpose of the statute; the manner in which the regulation evolved; the
length of time the regulation has been in effect; the reliance placed on it;
the consistency of interpretation; and the degree of scrutiny Congress has
devoted to the regulation;
2. Federal courts should give temporary regulations the same deference as
described above, provided that the promulgation of such regulations meets
the good cause standards as specified in the Administrative Procedure Act
for promulgating regulations without notice and comment;
3. Federal courts should give revenue rulings, certain revenue procedures, and
notices, deference under the doctrine of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S.
134 (1944), which directs courts to take into account the agency's experience and its power to persuade, but to retain the ability to choose a better
rule even if the agency interpretation is reasonable; and
4. Federal courts should take into account unofficial agency interpretations,
such as private letter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and litigating
positions, only to the extent to which their logic and reasoning appeal to
the reviewing court.
III. REPORT
PART I: DISCUSSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Introduction: JudicialDeference to Agency Pronouncements
In our modem administrative state, the degree of deference that federal courts
owe to administrative pronouncements is a vexing issue, one frequently scrutinized by the Supreme Court.' Regular attention from the Supreme Court, how'For a discussion of general policy issues regarding deference to administrative agencies, see John
F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretation of Agency
Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administrationafter Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 2071 (1990).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3

SECTION OF TAXATION

ever, has failed to produce clarity for administrative law, in general, or for tax
law, in particular. The recent case of United States v. Mead Corporation,533
U.S. 218 (2001), in which the Supreme Court addressed in detail the issue of
deference to administrative agencies, introduced further confusion. Mead seems
to have curtailed the reach of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), under which administrative interpretations are entitled to a
high degree of deference when Congress has not addressed the precise question
at issue, and to give renewed prominence to the test of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), under which the degree of deference a court gives to an
administrative interpretation can vary depending upon a variety of factors. 3
Skidmore, unlike Chevron, allows the reviewing court to choose a better rule
even if the agency interpretation is reasonable.
Before Mead, it seemed that a court reviewing an administrative pronouncement had to choose between affording an agency Chevron deference or giving
the agency's interpretation no deference at all. After Mead, the options have
expanded: Chevron deference, Skidmore deference, or no deference. Mead, however, offers no clear guidance as to how or when a court must choose between
the Chevron and Skidmore standards. In Mead, the Supreme Court held that a
tariff classification ruling issued by the United States Customs Service was not
entitled to judicial deference under Chevron, but was "eligible to claim respect
according to its persuasiveness," under Skidmore. Mead, 533 U.S. at 221. The
Court held that "administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law and that

'Under Chevron, the issue of deference arises only if Congress has not addressed the issue:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear .... the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of
an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous . . .the
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
467 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted). Under step one of the Chevron two-step approach, courts can
and do invalidate administrative pronouncements they find inconsistent with the statute, without
reaching the issue of deference. For a recent step-one tax case, which invalidated a regulation
dealing with disclosure of exempt organization determinations, see Tax Analysts v. InternalRevenue
Service, 350 F.3d 100, 102-105 (D.C. Cir. 2003). This Report is limited to the issues involved when
a court reaches step two of Chevron. The Report does not, moreover, discuss the issues that arise
when a court interprets a statute prior to any agency interpretation. For a discussion of this latter set
of issues, see Gregg Polsky, Can Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
3
Skidmore speaks of "the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade ..."Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Mead lists "the merit of [the] writer's thoroughness, logic,
and expertness, its fit with prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight" as factors under
Skidmore. Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3
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the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of
that authority." Id. at 226-27. The opinion continues, "Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication of
a comparable congressional intent." Id. It does not define what "some other
4
indication" might be.
Mead suggests that the result should turn on the intention of Congress on an
agency-by-agency basis. The opinion recognizes that there are limits on the
judiciary's ability to lay down rules of general application regarding deference
to administrative agencies. As Justice Souter wrote, an "inescapable feature of
the body of congressional legislation authorizing administrative action" is "the
great variety of ways in which the laws invest the Government's administrative
arms with discretion, and with procedures for exercising it, in giving meaning to
Acts of Congress." Mead, 533 U.S. at 235-36. Similarly, a leading administrative law scholar recently wrote that "to really begin to understand agency interpretive practice" requires "case studies of individual agencies or programs by
scholars who understand the substantive fields."5 This Report presents such an
analysis for the IRS/Treasury.
Ironically, it is uncertain whether Mead and Chevron will be the primary
authorities governing the tax law. In tax cases, the Supreme Court has relied
instead on a separate line of Supreme Court tax jurisprudence asking whether a
tax regulation is reasonable.6 The fullest statement of this reasonableness test
came in National Muffler Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1978).
Upholding a denial of tax exemption for a trade association pursuant to standards described in a regulation under section 501(c)(6), NationalMuffler tested
the reasonableness of the regulation according to such factors as the extent to
which the regulation harmonizes with the plain language, origin, and purpose of
the statute; the manner in which the regulation evolved; the length of time the
regulation had been in effect; the reliance placed on it; the consistency of interpretation; and the degree of scrutiny Congress had devoted to it. 440 U.S. at 477.
National Muffler concluded that although the regulation at issue in the case was
"not the only possible" reading of the statutory language, it merited "serious

'Mead also introduces uncertainty regarding the continued viability of Bowles v. Seminole Rock &
Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), and its progeny, under which a court must defer to an administration
agency's interpretation of its own regulation. Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 413-14. Mead fails to
discuss the relationship of this line of cases to the rules it announces. For further discussion of
Seminole Rock, see infra Part 1H,Section B.
'Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency and Statutory Interpretation,IssuEs iN LEGAL ScHOLARSHip, Symposium
on Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (2002), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art9/, p. 26
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004). See also Peter L. Strauss, Teaching Administrative Law: The Wonder of
the Unknown, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 8 (1983) (discussing view of some administrative law scholars and
practitioners that administrative law must be considered and studied agency by agency).
6
1n one case, United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), the Court did cite Chevron in deferring
to an IRS regulation. Boyle, 469 U.S. at 246 n.4. As discussed infra note 112, the case does not
represent a switch from National Muffler to Chevron.
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deference" under the factors listed, id. at 484, and that "[t]he choice among
reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts," id. at 488.
Lower courts confronting the validity of interpretations of the tax law issued
by the Internal Revenue Service, the Justice Department, or the Treasury (hereinafter collectively the "IRS") have been and continue to be confused.' Despite a
lack of consistency in the case law, a set of principles emerges from the cases
that can and should guide courts in deciding the level of deference owed to IRS
interpretations of the tax law. As discussed further in the following sections of
this Report, these principles are based on (1) the nature and role of the agency
that administers this area of law, (2) the extent to which an agency interpretation
has the force of law, and (3) the degree of deliberation and care that an agency
puts into making an interpretation. Applying these principles, the recommendations undertake to balance the needs of the agency, the demands of tax policy,
the rights of taxpayers, and the role of the courts.
B. The Nature and Role of the IRS
The tax law permeates every aspect of life, both business and personal. The
IRS touches the lives of almost every American. For calendar year 2002, for
example, Americans filed 118,538,000 individual tax returns.' In many ways,
the pervasiveness of the IRS seems to argue for a high level deference to its
interpretations. Certainty regarding tax rules is particularly important when so
many citizens must comply and file returns that are consistent with them. To aid
taxpayers, the IRS issues a staggering array of guidance documents, and does so
in large numbers. 9
A general policy of deference, moreover, would increase the likelihood of
national uniformity regarding the meaning of the tax laws by decreasing the
likelihood that courts would adopt differing views with respect to the meaning
of particular provisions of the Code. A policy favoring deference also could
encourage the IRS to issue as much guidance as possible.
7
See
8

infra Part II, Section E of this Report.
1IR-News Rel. 2003-59, 2003 TAX Noms TODAY 86-97 (May 5, 2003).
9
In2000, Tax Analysts published a draft inventory of IRS Guidance documents that included 39
distinct categories. Inventory of IRS Guidance Documents-A Draft, 88 TAX NOTES (TA) 305 (July
17, 2000). The annual quantities in recent years of the types of documents that are discussed later in
this Report are as follows. For each type of document, a cite to the final document published in each
year is also provided:
In 2001: 66 revenue rulings, see 2001-53 I.R.B. 637; 61 revenue procedures, see 2001-53 I.R.B.
653; 84 notices, see 2001-53 I.R.B. 642; and 124 announcements, see 2001-52 I.R.B. 630.
In 2002: 91 revenue rulings, see 2002-52 I.R.B. 991; 75 revenue procedures, see 2002-52 I.R.B.
997; 115 notices, see 2002-52 IRB 999; and 80 announcements, see 2002-51 IRB 980.
In 2003: 128 revenue rulings, see 2003-52 I.R.B. 1247; 86 revenue procedures, see 2003-50 I.R.B.
1211; 89 announcements, see 2003-52 I.R.B. 1256; 81 notices, see 2003-51 I.R.B. 1223.
In both 2001 and 2002, the IRS released to the public some 2,000 private letter rulings and in
2003, more than 1800 private letter rulings (based on a search of "administrative rulings; private
letter rulings" in the Tax Notes Today file of LEXIS from Jan. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2001; from Jan. 1,
2002 to Dec. 31, 2002; and from Jan. 1, 2003 to Dec. 31, 2003, respectively). As is discussed infra,
private letter rulings are addressed to individual taxpayers. Before being released to the public, the
rulings are redacted to eliminate names and other identifying information.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3
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Many of the factors which the Supreme Court has identified as favoring
deference to administrative agencies, in general, apply as well to the IRS. Skidmore
speaks of agencies possessing "specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case." 10
323 U.S. at 139. In Barnhartv. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002), a post-Mead
deference case, the Court lists a half a dozen factors, including "the related
expertise of the agency" and "the complexity of ... administration" as important
factors calling for Chevron deference. These factors all favor deference toward
IRS interpretations.
But another set of factors argues in favor of a cautious approach to a grant of
broad deference. First, the IRS has some inherent advantages over taxpayers.
For example, in judicial proceedings, the assessment or determination of the IRS
is presumed to be correct.'1 Prior to 1998, the taxpayer had the burden to supply
prima facie evidence contrary to the IRS's position in order to go forward with a
12
case, as well as the ultimate burden of persuasion on the merits of the issue.
Only recently has Congress shifted some of the burden of proof onto the IRS. In
1998, Congress adopted section 7491 in response to the concern that "individual
and small business taxpayers frequently are at a disadvantage when forced to
litigate with the Internal Revenue Service." 3 It remains to be seen, however,
whether this shift of the ultimate burden of factual proof to the IRS will have
much of an effect. For example, the new rule does not apply to most significant
corporate, partnership and trust deficiencies, in view of the $7 million net worth

"°It has been suggested that Tax Court judges, many with IRS experience or otherwise experienced
in tax practice, are less likely to defer to IRS interpretations than are generalist judges in the federal
courts. Linda Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings: Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56
OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1075-76 (1995).
"Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933) ("[The Commissioner's] ruling has the support of
a presumption of correctness, and the petitioner has the burden of proving it to be wrong").
2
See Danville Plywood Corp. v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 584, 593-94 (1989). The 1998 Joint
Committee Bluebook quotes the following explanation from Danville with approval: "This presumption in favor of the Commissioner is a procedural device that requires the plaintiff to go forward with
prima facie evidence to support a finding contrary to the Commissioner's determination. Once this
procedural burden is satisfied, the taxpayer must still carry the ultimate burden of proof or persuasion on the merits. Thus, the plaintiff not only has the burden of proof of establishing that the
Commissioner's determination was incorrect, but also of establishing the merit of its claims by a
preponderance of the evidence." J. Comm. ON TAX 'N, 105TH CONo., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX
LEoIs. ENACTED IN 1998, 56 (1998).
3S. REP. No. 105-174, at 44-46 (1998). This new section shifts the burden of proof on the factual

issue to the IRS, as long as the taxpayer satisfies certain criteria. If the taxpayer introduces any
"credible evidence" with respect to a factual issue in question, complies with substantiation requirements, maintains adequate records, cooperates with reasonable IRS requests for information, and is
either a business with a net worth of $7 million or less or an individual, the burden of proof on that
factual issue will then shift to the IRS. Credible evidence is described as "the quality of evidence
which, after critical analysis, the court would find sufficient upon which to base a decision on the
issue if no contrary evidence were submitted (without regard to the judicial presumption of IRS
correctness)." Id. at 45. "[Ilmplausible factual assertions, frivolous claims or tax protestor-type
arguments" are not credible evidence. Id.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3
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limit. Moreover, early cases under section 7491 suggest that the results under the
14
new statute do not change.
Another advantage for the IRS is case law requiring that taxpayers fall squarely
within a provision that grants a deduction or credit. As the Supreme Court
observed in INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), "In exploring the
relationship between deductions and capital expenditures, this Court has noted
the 'familiar rule' that an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace
and that the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on
the taxpayer." 503 U.S. at 84. See also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 721 (1969)
(recognizing the "principle that exemptions from taxation are to be construed
narrowly"). Indeed, it would be inconsistent with Mead's call for an agency-byagency analysis to ignore the advantage of the IRS in this regard.
Second, a general policy of broad deference seems unjustified in view of the
very large, almost punitive, amounts of penalties, as well as interest charges that
go well beyond time value of money considerations, that often accumulate in
large tax cases and which can far exceed the original deficiency. The IRS's
ability to impose confiscatory penalties and rates of interest not consistent with
time value concepts warrants caution in applying deference to agency pronouncements.15 The problem may become more severe since there are bills pending
before Congress that threaten to impose no-fault penalties of 40%. 16 The Task
Force believes that few, if any, other agencies can and do assert penalties of
such magnitude and frequency as the IRS. 17
Third, and most important, the primary purpose of the IRS is to raise money
for the government."8 "[T]he major responsibility of the Internal Revenue Ser14

See, e.g., Okerlund v. Commissioner, 53 Fed. Cl. 341, 355-56 (2002); Hunt & Sons, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 83 T.C.M. (CCH) 1345, 1347-48, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-65, at 366; Estate of
True v. Commissioner, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) 2001-167. In a recent case,
however, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted section 7491 as having a more farreaching effect, requiring the Tax Court to analyze critically the taxpayer's evidence and explain its
findings on the-credibility of that evidence. Griffin v. Commissioner, 315 F.3d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir.
2003); see also Stephen G. Salley & Anthony J. Scaletta, The Incredible Taxpayer: The U.S. Tax
Court and I.R.C. § 7491, 77 FLA.BAR J. 80, 82 (2003).
15
As a general matter, interest assessed on underpayments is meant to compensate the government
for the use of its tax dollars and, thus, is considered in the nature of compensation rather than
penalty. This is not the case, however, with respect to so-called "hot interest," which is punitive in
nature and, thus, functions as both an interest charge and a penalty. In the case of C corporations, the
underpayment rate is increased by two percentage points with respect to any tax in excess of
$100,000. I.R.C. § 6621(c). Moreover, the enhanced rate applies not only to the underlying tax, but
also to any interest, penalties, additional amounts, and additions to tax imposed with respect to the
underlying tax. Reg. § 301.6621-3(b)(2)(i). See Burgess J. W. Raby & William L. Raby, Corporate
Deficiency Rate Now Four Times the Refund Rate, 2003 TAX NoTEs TODAY 190-37 (Oct. 6, 2003).
"6See, e.g., S.476, 108th Cong., § 704 (2003) (adding section 6662B "Penalty for Understatements
Attributable to Transactions Lacking Economic Substance, etc.").
1It is noteworthy in this regard that judicial deference is not applied in the criminal area and
presumably is not applied with respect to the imposition of financial penalties for criminal tax fraud.
See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to FederalCriminalLaw?, 110 HARv.L. REV. 469 (1996).
"1 The IRS, perhaps uniquely among federal agencies, justifies its staff and budget requests by how
much money it collects. See HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Treasury, Postal Service, & General
Gov't, of the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong., 688, 701 (1995); see also Gary L.
Rodgers, The Commissioner "DoesNot Acquiesce," 59NEB. L. REv. 1001, 1024 n.162 (1980).
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vice is to protect the public fisc." United States v. Hughes Properties, Inc., 476
U.S. 593, 603 (1986). This unique purpose, in litigation outside the Tax Court,
gives rise to unique laws as to administrative procedure. The Supreme Court in
Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935), recognized the unique nature
of our tax assessment and collection system:
[T]axes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain availability an imperious need ....
Thus the usual procedure for the recovery of
debts is reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense ....

The

assessment supersedes the pleading, proof and judgment necessary in an action
at law, and has the force of such a judgment .... The taxpayer often is afforded
his hearing after judgment and after payment, and his only redress for unjust
administrative action is the right to claim restitution.
This function of the IRS may encourage the agency to issue rulings or to
promulgate regulations that test the outer limits of reasonableness. Courts have
scolded the IRS for twisting laws to further revenue collections rather than
Congressional purpose. See e.g., Estate of Clayton v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d
1486, 1499 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Such an arbitrary and unsupported misconstruction
of the statute ...

can only be explained as overzealousness in revenue collec-

tion"). As one commentator has observed: "As the nation's revenue collector...
the IRS should be expected to construe statutes in a light most favorable to the
collection of tax dollars. Deference in these circumstances deprives taxpayers of
an opportunity to convince a neutral arbiter that the government's position is
wrong."19

The IRS's stated mission has changed somewhat over the years. Until recently, the IRS Mission Statement emphasized its collection function:
The purpose of the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of
tax revenue at the least cost; serve the public by continually improving the
quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner warranting the
highest degree of public confidence in our integrity and fairness.20
In connection with the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, however,
Congress became concerned with IRS's "lack of appropriate attention to taxpayer needs" and mandated that "a key part of the IRS mission must be taxpayer
service. ' As a result, in 1999, the IRS announced a revised mission statement:
"Provide- America's taxpayers top quality services by helping them understand
and meet their tax responsibilities and by applying the tax law with integrity and
22
fairness to all."

'gGaller, supra note 10, at 1070-71.
2
°According to IR-News Rel. 1998-59 (Sept. 24, 1998), in which the IRS unveiled a new mission
statement, the previous version dated from the 1980's.
21S.
22 REP. No. 105-174, at 8 (1998).
Internal Revenue Service, The Agency and Its Mission, available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98141,00.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3
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The current IRS Commissioner, Mark W. Everson, is trying to balance collection and service. In announcing his confirmation by the Senate on May 1, 2003,
the IRS proclaimed that Mr. Everson's "priorities include strengthening enforcement of the tax laws and improving services for taxpayers." 23 The Commissioner's
chief of staff recently reiterated the need to balance collection and service when
he described a "widespread consensus" within the IRS that the agency should
focus on compliance, as well as customer service. These statements reflect that,
realistically, the need to collect revenue neither can nor should be dismissed by
the IRS.
In sum, some factors, such as the broad reach of the tax laws, the need for
national uniformity, the complexity of the tax law, and the expertise of the IRS,
quite clearly call for deference to the IRS, but others, such as the presumption of
correctness for IRS determinations, the narrow reading of statutory deductions
or credits, the size of possible penalties, and the revenue-raising function of the
IRS, caution against it. This mixed set of factors supports a set of guidelines
under which the degree of judicial deference should vary with different forms of
agency guidance.
C. Force of Law
Under Mead, deciding whether an agency pronouncement merits Chevron
deference requires an analysis both of Congressional intent to delegate authority
to make rules carrying the force of law and of the agency's intent to adopt rules
in the exercise of that authority. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27. The Supreme Court,
however, provided no bright line test for determining whether Congress has
made the requisite delegation of authority. Justice Scalia suggested in his Mead
dissent that the Court's omission in this regard would lead to "protracted confusion." 533 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such confusion certainly is the
case for tax law.
In general. Professor Thomas Merrill and Kathryn Watts recently suggested
that, at one time, Congress operated under a convention which provided a bright
line test for force of law: rules or regulations have the force of law if the relevant
statute specifically says so, or if Congress provided for penalties or other sanctions when rules or regulations are not followed. 24 According to Merrill and
23

Joe Thomdike, IRS Official Says Agency Will Emphasize Enforcement, 99 TAX NoMs (TA) 1598
(June 16, 2003); Heidi Glenn, Everson's IRS to Balance Service and Enforcement, 101 TAX NOTES
(TA) 465 (Oct. 27, 2003). Echoing the Commissioner's sentiments, Acting Deputy Commissioner of
the IRS Large and Midsize Business Division Frank Y. Ng recently remarked, "There is a need for
us to rebalance enforcement." Ng explained that both enforcement and service are a priority in
addressing the IRS's overall agenda. Kenneth A. Gary & Sirena J. Scales, Enforcement, Guidance
Remain Priorities,IRS Officials Say, 101 TAX NOTES (TA) 1378 (Dec. 22, 2003); see also Kenneth
A. Gary, IRS Officials Echo Everson: Quicken Audit Cycle, Push Enforcement, 101 TAX NoTEs (TA)
699 (Nov. 10, 2003). As a result of a reorganization in the Commissioner's office, there is now a
new position, "Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement." See, e.g., T.D. 9095, 68 Fed.
Reg. 65,634 (2003).
2
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REv.467 (2002).
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Watts, the convention took into account both explicit statements in the legislation and whether the statutory scheme provided for penalties or sanctions for
noncompliance.
Early tax laws seem to have followed this convention. The early revenue laws
expressly provided for rules with force of law. 25 The Act of July 14, 1870 gave
the Secretary of the Treasury the power "to make all needful rules or regulations
...which shall have the force of law."26 Subsequently, in the Revenue Acts of
1917, 1918 and 1921, Congress attached penalties for failure "to make any
returns required by regulations." In contrast, no sanctions were provided for
failure to comply with rules promulgated under the predecessor to section 7805(a),
which was first adopted in 1921.
But the convention that Merrill and Watts describe no longer is followed by
the courts and, were it to be resurrected, would not work well in the case of the
modem tax law. The Code was eventually amended to impose penalties for
"negligence or disregard of rules and regulations;" these penalties are now provided for in section 6662. According to the regulations, rules for this purpose
include revenue rulings and notices. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2). Several exceptions
apply to the negligence and disregard penalties, however, most notably where a
27
taxpayer's position "has a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits."
Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(3). This limited form of penalty-penalizing a taxpayer who
disregards rules and regulations only if there is not a realistic probability of the
taxpayer's position prevailing-may fall short of a sanction rising to the force of
law. The convention described by Merrill and Watts, then, would not settle the
issue of whether Congress intended such IRS interpretations as revenue rulings,
revenue procedures, and notices to have "force of law," as that phrase was
28
applied in Mead
As described below, the situation becomes yet more complicated when Mead's
additional requirement that an agency interpretation claiming deference must be
promulgated in the exercise of its delegated authority to make rules having the
force of law is applied to the varied forms of guidance issued by the IRS.

2

Much of the history that follows was developed in Merrill & Watts, supra note 24.
255, § 34, 16 Stat. 256, 271.
"A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of being sustained on its merits if a
reasonable and well-informed analysis by a person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a
person to conclude that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of being
sustained on its merits." Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1). Thus, no penalty would be applied to a taxpayer who
disregards a revenue ruling or notice and expects to lose a challenge to her position, so long as her
tax adviser reasonably believes in good faith that the likelihood of prevailing is at least one in three.
2
Indeed, Merrill and Watts acknowledge that the convention they find in the historic record has
disappeared, both in administrative law generally and in tax law. For most agencies, a general grant
of rulemaking power has come to be seen as a grant of authority to promulgate rules with the force
of law; such has not been the common understanding with respect to section 7805(a). Merrill and
Watts suggest that this is based on the influence of writings by tax giants Erwin Griswold and
Stanley Surrey rather than adherence to the "force of law" convention, which turned on the presence
of absence of sanctions for violation. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 24, at 570-78.
26

27Ch.
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Regulations. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) defines a "rule" as
"the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or
describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency."
5 U.S.C. § 551(4). The APA requires agencies to follow notice-and-comment
procedures when they promulgate rules that bind the public. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
In administrative law generally, such binding rules are known generally as legislative rules or regulations. The APA explicitly exempts from the notice-andcomment requirements "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or
rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." Id.2 9 In the case of regulations, tax law has used a different basis to distinguish between legislative and
interpretive rules. In tax, legislative regulations are those promulgated pursuant
to a specific grant of authority under some provision of the Internal Revenue
Code.30 Interpretive regulations are those promulgated under the general authority of section 7805(a), which directs the Secretary of the Treasury "to prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title."'" In promulgating interpretive regulations, the IRS invariably specifies that "section 553(b)
of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 553) does not apply to these
regulations. '32 At the same time, however, it is the customary practice of the IRS
to follow notice-and-comment procedures for interpretive regulations.3 3 Temporary regulations, whether legislative or interpretive, are issued without notice
and comment.
Thus, the IRS does not claim to be exercising its authority to act with the
force of law when it promulgates interpretive regulations. It does, nonetheless,
use notice and comment. Moreover, failure to follow interpretive tax regulations

29
Rules that otherwise would be subject to notice-and-comment rules also are exempt when the
agency, for good cause, finds that the notice-and-comment procedure is "impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b). Issuance of temporary regulations generally is
thought to come within this exception. But see Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Temporary Regulations, 44 TAX LAW. 343 (1991), and the discussion of temporary regulations,
30 infra.
See Ellen P. Aprill, Muffled Chevron:Judicial Review of Tax Regulations, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 51,
55-57 (1996).
31
The Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between these two kinds of tax regulations.
See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); see also infra Part I, Section
D. The IRS has never asserted that section 7805(a) grants authority to issue legislative regulations,
although
similar language in other (non-tax) statutes has been deemed to do so.
32
See, e.g, T.D. 9043, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,313 (2003). Section 30(15) of the Internal Revenue Manual,
which comprises the Regulations Drafting Handbook, is consistent on this point: "5 U.S.C. 553(b)
requires that a notice of proposed rulemaking be published in the Federal Register and that interested
persons be given the opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations before final regulations are
adopted
....
However, these requirements do not apply if the rules are interpretative."
33
For recent examples, see Supplemental Proposed Regulations on Equity Split Dollar Life Insurance, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,898 (2003); Proposed Regulations on Changes in Accounting Method, 68 Fed.
Reg. 25,310 (2003); Proposed Regulations on Private Activity Bond Definition, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,845
(2003). To its credit, the IRS has often expanded the notice and comment period by announcing that
it intended to issue proposed regulations, and inviting comments even before the proposed regulations are published. See, e.g., Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Credit for Increasing
Research Authority, 69 Fed. Reg. 43 (2004).
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can give rise to penalties. Furthermore, Regulation section 601.601(a)(1) states:
"Internal Revenue rules take various forms. The most important rules are issued
as regulations and Treasury decisions prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary or his delegate." This characterization does not distinguish between legislative and interpretive regulations.
Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures. Revenue rulings and revenue
procedures, in contrast, clearly fit within the definition of interpretive rules in
the APA.3 4 The IRS traditionally has not taken the position that revenue rulings
or revenue procedures have the force of law. 35 Originally, the IRS explicitly
disavowed the binding nature of its rulings, suggesting that rulings published in
the Internal Revenue Bulletin merely indicated a "trend," that revenue rulings
"do not commit" the agency, and that rulings be viewed as "aids in studying" the
law.36 Nor does the IRS currently claim that its revenue rulings and revenue
procedures have the force of law. The weekly Internal Revenue Bulletin states
explicitly that revenue rulings and revenue procedures "do not have the force
and effect of Treasury Department Regulations, but they may be used as precedents." Each Bulletin then cautions:
In applying published rulings and procedures, the effect of subsequent legislation, regulations, court decisions, rulings, and procedures must be considered,
and Service personnel and others are cautioned against reaching the same conclusions in other cases unless the facts and circumstances are substantially the
same.
Under the current revenue rulings program, which began in 1953,1 7 the IRS
describes a revenue ruling as "an official interpretation by the Service that has
been published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin." Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a);
Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 I.R.B. 1. Revenue rulings are issued only by the IRS
National Office. The'IRS originally intended the 1953 program to serve three
purposes. First, revenue rulings would be a vehicle through which the National
Office could inform field personnel of precedents or guiding positions. Second,
the Internal Revenue Bulletin, in which revenue rulings are published, would

'See Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts, 7
J. ON REG. 1, 44 n.204 (1990). Because revenue rulings are "classic examples" of interpretive
rules, they are exempt from notice-and-comment issuance procedures. See Johnson City Medical
Center v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 980 (6th Cir. 1993) (Batchelder, J., dissenting); Northern
Illinois Gas. Co. v. United States, 743 F.2d 539, 541 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984); Wing v. Commissioner, 81
T.C. 17, 27 (1983).
"inrecent cases, the IRS argued, unsuccessfully, that revenue rulings and revenue procedures are
likely entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine. SeeAeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner,
347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003), for revenue rulings and Fed. National Mortgage Ass'n v. United
States,
56 Fed. Cl. 228, 234-35 (2003), for revenue procedures.
36
See Internal Revenue Bulletin for January-June, 1924 (C.R. I1-1),
issued shortly after the agency
was given authority to issue all needful rules and regulations.
37See Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484.
YALE
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provide a permanent, indexed reference to IRS positions. Third, revenue rulings
would enable the public to review intragency communications that the IRS uses
as precedents or guides.38 In 1989, the Service revised its description of the
purposes of the revenue rulings program, as simply promoting uniform application of the tax laws and assisting taxpayers in attaining maximum voluntary
compliance.3 9
A revenue procedure, according to the official IRS definition, is "a statement
of procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of
the public under the Code and related statutes or information that, although not
necessarily affecting the rights and duties of the public, should be a matter of
public knowledge." Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b); Rev. Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 I.R.B.
1, 2. The revenue procedure program was established in 1955. 40 At that time, the
IRS explicitly distinguished revenue procedures from revenue rulings, the latter
pertaining to "substantive tax law," as opposed to "internal practices or proce41
dures.
In recent years, however, the IRS seems to have expanded the function of
revenue procedures. For example, Regulation section 1.601 1-4(b)(8)(i) provides
that a transaction will not be considered a transaction within the categories that
must be reported to the IRS if the Commissioner makes a determination by
published guidance that the transaction is not subject to the reporting requirements. The IRS has chosen to use revenue procedures to issue such published
guidance. See Rev. Proc. 2003-24, 2003-1 C.B. 599; Rev. Proc. 2003-25, 2003-1
C.B. 601.
Notices. Unlike revenue rulings and revenue procedures, both the history
and purpose of notices are obscure. No Treasury regulation prescribes or describes notices. The Internal Revenue Bulletin, in which most notices are published, is silent on their substantive impact, stating only that "[r]ulings and
procedures ... may be used as precedents." 42 Equally silent is Revenue Procedure 2003-1, which provides only that "[t]he Service provides guidance in the
form of letter rulings, closing agreements, determination letters, information
letters, revenue rulings and oral advice." 2003-1 I.R.B. 1, 2.
Other official sources provide a little more insight. The Chief Counsel Publication Handbook describes the various purposes of a notice, including substantive guidance:

38
Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484; see also Sandor v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469, 481 (1974)
(noting that the purpose of publication of revenue rulings is to promote uniform application of tax
laws
39 by Service employees), aff d, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).
Rev. Proc. 1989-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 814-15.
'Rev.
Proc. 1955-1, 1955-2 C.B. 897.
41
1d.
42
See, e.g., 2003-26 I.R.B. 2.
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A notice is a public pronouncement that may contain guidance that involves
substantive interpretations of the Code or other provisions of the law. Notices
may also be used for materials that would be appropriate for an announcement
but for the need to preserve the guidance in the Cumulative Bulletin. For
example, notices can be used to relate what regulations will say in situations
where the regulations may not be published in the immediate future.
I.R.M. 30.15.10.
The IRS web site suggests that a notice can, in some cases, contain "guidance
that involves substantive interpretation. ' 43 A recent Chief Counsel Notice concludes that a notice provides "final guidance," which precludes Chief Counsel
attorneys from arguing a case contrary to a notice. 44 In addition, taxpayers may
rely on notices for penalty avoidance purposes under Regulation section 1.66613(b)(2) (the "administrative pronouncement" rule). See Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 78 (1993).
Commentators say very little about notices. Michael Saltzman's IRS procedure treatise discusses a litany of guidance types, from revenue rulings to information letters, but never mentions notices.45 Another treatise contains only a
brief description of notices:
In recent years, in lieu of releasing time-consuming revenue rulings and revenue procedures, the Service has been relying heavily on notices, announcements, and information releases. The Service issues a notice when it wishes to
provide guidance before a ruling or regulation is available.46
Case law regarding notices is also sparse. At least one case places notices
below revenue rulings in the deference hierarchy, Costantino v. TRW, Inc., 13
F.3d 969, 980-81 (6th Cir. 1994), while another court places notices at the same
level as revenue rulings. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 78,
99 (1993).
The most significant notices issued by the IRS in recent years relate to potentially abusive tax shelter transactions, which the IRS designates as "listed" for
disclosure purposes. Typically, the opening paragraph of these notices suggests
that they are primarily designed to alert promoters and potential investors to
potential liabilities. For example, Notice 2001-16, 2001-1 C.B. 730, begins as
follows:
The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department have become aware
of certain types of transactions, described below, that are being marketed to

43

Intemal Revenue Service, Understanding IRS Guidance-A Brief Primer, available at http://
www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=101 102,00.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
'Chief Counsel Notice CC-2003-014 (May 8, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsccdm/cc-2003-014.pdf
(last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
45
See MICHAEL I. S ALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ca.3 (Rev. 2d ed. 2003).
46
1A L. SHAFIROFF,INrERNAL REVENUE SERVICE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE DESKaOOK § 1:4.3(D) (3d ed.
2003).
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taxpayers for the avoidance of federal income taxes. The Service and Treasury
are issuing this notice to alert taxpayers and their representatives of
certain
47
responsibilities that may arise from participation in these transactions.
While these notices regarding listed transactions suggest possible legal theories
in support of the IRS's position, they normally provide only a brief, general
factual description, with the legal theories effectively constituting an advance
notice of a litigating position. Such notices also describe potential penalties.
Other typical notices anticipate proposed regulations, see, e.g., Notice 200218, 2002-1 C.B. 644 (duplicated loss consolidated return regulations), or provide
substantive legal guidance on which taxpayers are explicitly told they may rely,
see, e.g., Notice 1996-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359 (cash balance plans). Some notices
specifically state that they may be relied on as if they were revenue rulings. See,
e.g., Notice 1989-99, 1989-2 C.B. 422 (valuation freezes).
Other Guidance. The IRS issues a variety of other documents and forms of

guidance involving particular transactions or disputes. Private letter rulings, for
example, involve prospective transactions, and are directed only at the individual
taxpayers who requested them. Reg. § 601.201(b). Copies of private letter rulings, redacted to remove information that identifies the taxpayer, are made available to the public. 4a The IRS also issues technical advice memoranda, usually to
resolve disputes between taxpayers and revenue agents. Reg. § 602.205(b)(5).
Just recently, the IRS began issuing technical expedited advice memoranda to
resolve such disputes more quickly. Rev Proc. 2002-30, 2002-1 C.B. 118. In
addition, the IRS Chief Counsel's office releases a variety of inter-agency legal
memoranda, e.g., Field Service Advice, Chief Counsel Advice, etc., setting forth
that office's analysis of substantive law. Section 6110(k) provides that such
"written determinations may not be used or cited as precedent."
Conclusion. In light of the plethora of guidance issued by the IRS and the
uncertainties regarding their legal status, in either absolute or in relative terms,
applying the twin requirements of Mead-force of law and agency intentionyields mixed or inconclusive results. The varying degrees to which different IRS
interpretations are imbued with the force of law and are intended to be so
exercised suggest varying degrees of deference depending on the form of an IRS
interpretation.
D. Degree of Deliberation
Also crucial is the degree. of deliberation the IRS gives various kinds of
interpretations. This consideration has had prominence as far back as Skidmore,
with its language regarding "the thoroughness evident in its consideration" and

47

See also Notice 2002-65, 2002-2 C.B. 690.
Availability for public inspection and redaction are both statutorily required. I.R.C. § 611 0(a),

48

(c).
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"the validity of its reasoning." Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. The degree of deliberation also affects the reasoning and reasonableness of an interpretation, thus
tying it to Chevron itself. This principle is related as well to Mead's stated
criteria of "thoroughness, logic and expertise," Mead, 533 U.S. at 235; to
Barnhart's"careful consideration the Agency has given the question," Barnhart,
535 U.S. at 522; and to National Muffler's "manner in which [the regulation]
evolved," National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477.
By degree of deliberation, this Report does not mean a mechanical, quantitative test such as the number of hours spent in reviewing the agency pronouncement, but a qualitative test, one that takes into account the number of levels of
review, in particular how high the level of review reaches, 49 and considers the
degree of public input via the notice-and-comment process.
Final Regulations. Regulations receive the greatest degree of deliberation
and consideration from the IRS. As Regulation section 601.601(a)(1) explains,
"The most important rules are issued as regulations and Treasury decisions
prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary or his delegate.
...After approval by the Commissioner, regulations and Treasury decisions are
forwarded to the Secretary or his delegate for further consideration and final
approval." This regulation goes on to specify further procedures, including public hearings and comments on proposed rules, "[w]here required by 5 U.S.C.
553," which, as noted earlier, is the provision of the APA requiring notice and
comment'for legislative regulations. Moreover, section 7805(f) requires the IRS
to solicit comments from the Small Business Administration regarding the impact of any proposed or temporary regulation on small business.
In practice, the IRS gives the same careful consideration, including publication of proposed regulations with opportunity for notice and comment and a
preamble highlighting particular comments and issues, to both legislative and
interpretive regulations. The Internal Revenue Manual includes a 40,000 word
chapter entitled, "Regulation Drafting Handbook," I.R.M. 30.15.20 (1995), which
describes regulations as "the most authoritative component of the process that
transforms tax statutes into an equitable, efficient process for collecting revenue." The procedures detailed in the Handbook include the following: a drafter
from the Office of Chief Counsel, a reviewer from the Office of Chief Counsel,

49
This principle has much in common with the suggestion made in David J. Barron & Elena
Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 Sup. CT. REV. 201 (2001), that, since the justification for Chevron deference is that agency interpretations are products of the executive branch, which
is politically accountable through the relationship of an agency to the President, Chevron deference
should be limited to those agency pronouncements for which officials at the highest level in the
agency take personal responsibility. Along such lines, this Report reserves Chevron deference for
those agency interpretations that are issued by the agency official with responsibility for policy,
which in the case of tax law is the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, who is
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Assistant Secretary can delegate the
authority to sign regulations only to the Deputy Assistant Secretary. For current delegation orders,
see www.treas.gov/regs/tdOO-08.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2004).
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and an attorney from the Treasury Department Office of Tax Policy, working
together to identify issues, often in the form of a memo; exchanging drafts of the
regulations informally among this group; circulating drafts to others; guidance
briefings, as needed and often in the form of a policy memo, with the Chief
Counsel, the Commissioner, and individuals in the Treasury Department; preparing a signature package; soliciting public written comments; drafting an issues memo after the comment period has ended; and preparing the final regulations. All final regulations are issued as Treasury decisions, which are approved
and signed by the Assistant Treasury Secretary (or Deputy Assistant Secretary)
for Tax Policy, as well as the Commissioner (or Deputy Commissioner). 0
Importantly, both interpretive and legislative regulations are promulgated
through notice and comment, as noted earlier. Public participation through the
APA notice-and-comment process is important for essentially two reasons. First,
the combined expertise and knowledge of agency administrators and interested
persons is thought to result in better rules. The process helps to ensure that
important issues are not ignored and that they receive careful consideration.
Second, the notice-and-comment procedure serves as a quasi-democratic
process.
The adage "two heads are better than one" comes to mind when administrative rules result from the combined knowledge and expertise of agency administrators and the interested public. Members of particular groups or industries
possess a wealth of information from which agencies may benefit in the drafting
of rules. The Treasury Department's consistent and careful regard for public
comments on proposed regulations reflects its recognition of the value of those
comments. Public input, moreover, can serve to offset institutional biases in
favor of or against particular groups, and enables affected persons to defend
themselves against rules that may be detrimental to their interests. As the Supreme Court wrote in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996), the noticeand-comment process is "designed to assure due deliberation."
Because agencies are not directly accountable to voters, the notice-and-comment process also alleviates the inherent lack of democratic debate both by
allowing affected persons to have a voice in the process and by requiring the
agency to read and respond to comments. Notice-and-comment procedures enable those with opposing viewpoints to attempt to influence agency action in an
open fashion and minimize opportunities for administrative decision-making
behind closed doors. An important feature of the process is that the APA requires notice of the "basis and purpose" of its publication. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
The current practice of issuing detailed preambles, discussing the rules adopted

50
For recent examples, see T.D. 9059, 68 Fed. Reg. 34,293 (2003) (allocation of basis among
partnership assets); T.D. 9058, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,349 (2003) (interest rate for insurance company tax
reserves); T.D. 9057, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,351 (2003) (waiver of certain section 1502 elections).
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and alternatives rejected, demonstrates both careful consideration and responsiveness to taxpayer concerns.51
Courts have indicated that the notice-and-comment procedure enhances the
quality of judicial review by providing affected parties an opportunity to develop an evidentiary record to support their objections to rules. See, e.g., Small
Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1271 n.54 (9th Cir. 1977); cf.
Schwalbach v. Commissioner, 111 T.C. 215, 228 (1998) ("purpose of notice and
comment is not adequately served, on the other hand, where interested persons
could not reasonably anticipate the final rules from the proposed rules"). Thus,
although notice-and-comment is not a panacea,5 2 notice-and-comment ensures a
high level of deliberation and the quasi-democratic process that justifies Chevron deference.
Temporary and Proposed Regulations. Treasury regulations typically are
not effective, i.e., have no force of law, until they are made final by publication
in the Federal Register. See, e.g., Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108
(1983), affd, 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (proposed regulation represents
only a "preliminary proposal," not binding "on respondent or on the Court").
Many times, however, Treasury simultaneously issues proposed regulations as
temporary regulations. Unlike proposed regulations, temporary regulations are
effective when they initially appear in the Federal Register, thus providing immediate and binding guidance to taxpayers. Significantly, temporary regulations
are issued without the benefit of notice and comment.
In 1988, Congress enacted section 7805(e), which provides that temporary tax
regulations issued after November 20, 1988, "shall expire" unless replaced by a
final regulation within three years of the date on which the proposed regulations
were issued. What legislative history there is suggests that Congress was concerned by the length of time that regulations were left in temporary form and
that it wished to codify the practice of seeking post-effective comment on temporary regulations. 3
Revenue Rulings, Revenue Procedures,and Notices. As discussed earlier,
revenue rulings are official publications of the IRS, but are not as authoritative
as regulations. Regulation section 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) states, "Revenue Rulings

"See, e.g., T.D. 8294, 55 Fed. Reg. 9426 (1990) & T.D. 8364, 57 Fed. Reg. 53,550 (1992)
(consolidated return loss disallowance regulations); T.D. 8978, 67 Fed. Reg. 12,471 (2002) (intermediate sanctions for exempt organizations). At least one case has invalidated a tax regulation for
failure to meet the notice requirement. See American Standard, Inc. v. United States, 602 F.2d 256,
267 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
"2 See, e.g., Barron & Kagan, supra note 49; Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify JudicialReview of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 T.x
L. REv. 483 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to ProfessorSeidenfeld, 75 TEx. L. REv. 525 (1997); Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts
on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 Due L.J. 1385 (1992).
"See Asimow, supra note 29, at 362-63.
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published in the Bulletin do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations (including Treasury decisions)." Neither do they receive the
same kind of careful consideration and review as regulations. After written
approval of a proposed ruling by the Chief Counsel, it is reviewed in the Office
of the Commissioner and in Treasury's Office of Tax Policy. Revenue rulings
are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin without prior notice to the public,
and the Service does not ordinarily solicit public comments before issuing them.
Revenue rulings are not formally signed by the Commissioner or the Assistant
Secretary for Tax Policy. Revenue rulings currently simply list the staff lawyer
in the Office of Chief Counsel who is the principal author, and give that person's
4
phone number for further information; no reference is made to section 7805.1
Revenue procedures, although intended to consist merely of procedural matters, see, e.g., Rev. Proc. 1989-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, sometimes reflect the IRS's
position on matters of substance or statutory construction. See, e.g., Rev. Proc.
1999-43, 1999-2 C.B. 579 (at issue in FederalNational Mortgage Association v.
United States, 56 Fed. Cl. 228, 234-35 (2003)) (hereinafter "FannieMae"). The
same, as discussed earlier, is true of notices. As with revenue rulings, revenue
procedures and notices are issued without prior notice to the public. In general,
revenue procedures are developed with the same kind of deliberative process as
revenue rulings, and it is likely that notices are issued through a similar process.
Other Guidance. Private letter rulings (PLRs) are issued by the IRS's
National Office at the request of specific taxpayers prior to the filing of a
return. 5 While the IRS generally welcomes inquiries of this sort, it may exercise
its discretion not to rule in any particular situation. Procedures for obtaining
PLRs are issued annually by the IRS's Office of Chief Counsel. See, e.g., Rev.
Proc. 2003-1, 2003-1 I.R.B. 1. Neither the Chief Counsel nor the IRS Commissioner is required to approve or sign a PLR; PLRs are issued by an Associate
Chief Counsel. The Task Force understands that PLRs typically are not reviewed outside of the branch that issues them.
Technical advice memoranda (TAMs) are similar to private letter rulings in
that they are issued by the National Office only in response to specific requests. 6 Unlike PLRs, however, TAMs generally are requested by IRS employees (in District Offices or Appeals Offices), but a request may sometimes be
initiated by a taxpayer. TAMs address technical or procedural questions that
develop during examination of a return (i.e., an audit), the appeals process, or
any other review in a field office. Like PLRs, TAMs are issued by an Associate
Chief Counsel; neither the Chief Counsel nor the Commissioner is required to
approve or sign a TAM. The Task Force understands that TAMs typically are

'See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-4, 2003-2 I.R.B. 253; Rev. Rul. 2003-13, 2003-4 I.R.B. 305.
55
For a general discussion of the application, issuance, and review procedures for PLRs, see
SALrzMAN, supra
56

note 45, at 3.03[3].

For a general discussion of the application, issuance, and review procedures for TAMs, see

SALTZMAN,

supra note 45, at 3.04[2].
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not reviewed outside of the branch that issues them.
It is the policy of the IRS to announce whether or not it will follow the
adverse holdings of selected cases. Those determinations, called Actions on
Decision (AODs), are prepared periodically. Although the texts of AODs
themselves are not formally published by the IRS, they are available in commercial databases. The conclusion of an AOD is published in the Internal Revenue
Bulletin and termed an acquiescence or nonacquiesence. See, e.g., Actions Relating to Decisions of the Tax Court, 2003-49 I.R.B. 1172 (Dec. 8, 2003). In the
view of the IRS, the purpose of issuing AODs is to provide guidance to IRS
personnel who may be working on issues similar to those in the cases. Id. As to
the weight or status of an AOD, each AOD contains the following language:
Unlike a Treasury Regulation or a Revenue Ruling, an Action on Decision is
not an affirmative statement of Service position. It is not intended to serve as
public guidance and may not be cited as precedent.
Id. See also Taxation With Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir.
1981) ("The purpose of the distribution [of AODs] is to provide a research tool
and guidance to Office of Chief Counsel brief writers in the field and in the
National Office. The distribution also provides guidance to IRS'field personnel
as to the legal positions of the Office of Chief Counsel on a given issue in the
time between an adverse decision in a court case and the ultimate resolution of
the issue after appeal or action on the application for certiorari.").
The IRS issues other materials, e.g., Publications, Forms, and Instructions, to
assist taxpayers in complying with their obligations under the tax laws. The
Task Force does not understand the IRS to intend any of these materials to have
the force of law.
Conclusion. The IRS has established a hierarchy of procedures for various
kinds of pronouncements that correlate with the level of authority assigned the
pronouncements. Thus, regulations receive the most scrutiny within the IRS and,
while legislative regulations and interpretive regulations share both internal development and issuance procedures, the IRS takes the position that interpretive
regulations do not necessitate notice and comment. Revenue rulings, next in
line, are issued through a routinized and comprehensive program within the
agency, but public notice and comment is not part of the process. Other forms of
informal guidance are subject to increasingly less formal review and issuance
procedures.
E. Explanation of Recommendations
After considering the case law and special concerns applicable to the tax law,
this Report makes the following recommendations to aid courts in cases involving judicial deference to IRS interpretations:
1. Federal courts should give Chevron deference to regulations promulgated by the IRS, with (i) legislative tax regulations receiving
controlling deference under Chevron so long as they are not arbiTax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3

SECTION OF TAXATION

trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute;
(ii) interpretive tax regulations receiving the same controlling deference if they are reasonable under the test of National Muffler,
which examines such factors as the extent to which the regulation
harmonizes with the plain language, origin, and purpose of the
statute; the manner in which the regulation evolved; the length of
time the regulation has been in effect; the reliance placed on it; the
consistency of interpretation; and the degree of scrutiny Congress
has devoted to the regulation; and (iii) temporary regulations receiving the same deference as above, provided that the promulgation of such regulations meets the good cause standards as specified
in the APA for promulgating regulations without notice and comment.
This recommendation melds traditional case law involving tax interpretations
with general administrative law jurisprudence. Regulations are the most authoritative of IRS pronouncements. Mead specifically lists notice and comment as an
indication that Congress has delegated authority to make rules with the force of
law, and, with the exception of temporary regulations, tax regulations are promulgated with notice and comment. As discussed above, notice and comment
helps ensure careful deliberation by the agency.
FinalRegulations. Regulations issued pursuant to a specific grant of authority and with notice and comment meet all of the tests of both Chevron and
Mead. These legislative regulations are appropriately subject to the "arbitrary
and capricious" test of Chevron's step two, for legislative regulations that are
promulgated pursuant to "an express delegation of authority ... to elucidate a
specific provision of the statute." See also APA § 706 (establishing arbitrary and
capricious standard for legislative rules).
The Task Force recommends that interpretive regulations also be afforded
Chevron deference, but articulates the test for reasonableness under National
Muffler. The difference in the recommendation for the tests applicable to legislative and interpretive regulations acknowledges the traditional difference in the
level of deference between legislative and interpretive regulations used in tax
cases. That is, for both legislative and interpretive tax regulations, a regulation
must be reasonable, but what is reasonable for a legislative regulation is broader
and thus easier to satisfy than what is reasonable for an interpretive regulation.
Once the reasonableness test is met, the regulation is given controlling power.
Some might argue that this distinction is both too complex and unjustified. In
the case of other administrative agencies, regulations promulgated under the
authority of a statutory provision similar to section 7805(a) are considered "legislative rules" under the Administrative Procedure Act.57 We conclude that all

7

See note 108 infra.
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IRS regulations, whether promulgated under the grant of authority in a particular
Code section-or under the. general authority of section 7805(a), are "legislative
rules" within the meaning of the APA. The traditional and well-entrenched use
of the term "interpretive" for regulations promulgated under the authority of
section 7805(a) breeds inevitable confusion. 8
Congress itself has had to deal with this confusion. The Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis Act, 5 U.S.C. § 603, requires all administrative agencies to prepare an
elaborate analysis of the impact of a proposed rule on small business entities: In
general, this requirement applies "[w]henever an agency is required by section
553 of this title, or any other law to publish a general notice of proposed
rulemaking for any proposed rule

. .

." § 603(a). Because the relationship be-

tween the APA and tax regulations promulgated under section 7805(a) is so
uncertain, Congress enacted a special rule regarding when the IRS must undertake this regulatory analysis: whenever an agency "publishes a notice of proposed rulemaking for an interpretative rule involving the internal revenue laws
of the United States." § 603(a). At least in this regard, Congress has decided that
a tax interpretive regulation shall be treated in the same way as a legislative rule
under the APA.
Virtually all regulations are legislative in that their authority derives from the
Congress. Chevron, in fact, makes that point: "sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than-explicit." 467
U.S. at 844 (emphasis supplied.) The Task Force believes that under Chevron
and Mead there are two types of "legislative" delegations: specific authority and
implicit (or general) authority. Specific authority regulations emanate from specific delegations in particular Code sections; implicit (or general authority) regulations are issued under the authority of section 7805(a) to fill in gaps left by the
Congress. The level of deference, however, differs: specific authority iegulations are applied "unless arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute," while general authority regulations are applied if "reasonable." This dichotomy is spelled out in Chevron9 and is restated in Mead, which also makes it
clear that a "legislative delegation" pursuant to "generally conferred authority"
(presumably such as is conferred under section 7805(a)) begets deference if "the
agency's interpretation is reasonable." Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
While a single test would simplify the task of the courts, we see no basis for
overturning the longstanding dichotomy, which is supported by Chevron and

5
For a discussion of the confusion this terminology produces, see Bankers Life and Casualty Co.
v. United
States, 142 F.3d 973 (7th Cir. 1998).
59
"If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843-44 (emphasis supplied).
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Mead as well as the plain meaning of the applicable tests.6' Logic also suggests
that a specific Congressional delegation of authority should command a higher
level of deference. Chevron cites U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984),
which makes this point: "[Regulations] are entitled to special deference since
that was the precise objective of Congress when it delegated authority to issue
regulations." This Report reviews post-Chevron tax cases through the end of
2003, and concludes that although Chevron's two-step process has been affirmed for tax cases, 62 the Supreme Court nonetheless has consistently applied
the NationalMuffler test to determine if a general authority regulation is reasonable.63 The distinction is also appropriate since Chevron offers no apparent guidance for applying the reasonableness test, while National Muffler provides considerable guidance. 64
The IRS's longstanding position that general authority regulations issued under section 7805(a) are "interpretive" rules, not requiring notice-and-comment
procedures under the APA, does not change our view. The IRS's assertion
cannot override the APA. 61 And whatever the source of the government's position, it seems inconsistent with Chevron; the government's position is also undercut by its invariable use of the notice-and-comment process for all regulations (other than temporary regulations). In any event, Mead and Barnhartkeep
the door open for Chevron deference to interpretations that are issued without
notice-and-comment 66 and Boeing Company v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003),

'Even before Chevron and Mead, the Supreme Court recognized this distinction. See, e.g., United
States v. Vogel Fertilizer, 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253
(1981).
"A position "manifestly contrary" to a statute is patently more difficult to prove than a position
which must "harmonize" with the statute. The dictionary also draws a sharp distinction between
arbitrary ("based on one's preference, notion, whim...") and reasonable ("amenable to reason; just
... sound judgment; sensible"). WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICIONARY COLLEGE EDrION (3d ed.). See
Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: DictionaryShopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARuz. ST. L.
REV.
62 375 (1998).
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998).
63
See Part II, Section D, infra.
64
"In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper
manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its
origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the
regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant
considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the
consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted
to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute." NationalMuffler, 440 U.S. at 477.
65
The Court of Federal Claims in Fannie Mae, 56 Fed. Cl. 228, 236 (2003), rejected Chevron
deference for a revenue procedure subject to limited notice and comment because the question "is
whether Congress intended for the IRS to do so." The court did not believe its anti-bootstrap analysis
applied to regulations since the court concluded that "Treasury regulations undoubtedly enjoy Chevron deference." Id at 235.
'Both Mead and Barnhartcite only a single case for this proposition - NationsBank.Notably, the
Fannie Mae case suggests that NationsBank is "a case limited to the Comptroller of the Currency's
long-standing personal authority to enforce the banking laws and promulgate directives with the
force of law," and of the few cases cited directly or indirectly by NationsBank, the only case to
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the Supreme Court's most recent review of tax regulations, instructs courts to
give deference to interpretive regulations.
In short, were we writing on a clean slate, we might refer to tax regulations as
either specific authority or general authority regulations, not as legislative or
interpretive regulations. In conformance with the longstanding tax convention,
however, this Report utilizes traditional nomenclature and deference levels. As
discussed above, all regulations are scrutinized under the standards adopted in
Chevron and restated in Mead. In applying the reasonableness test, National
Muffler and its progeny should be applied as to interpretive regulations since
that is the standard being applied by the Supreme Court.
Temporary Regulations. As explained above, this Report suggests that all
IRS regulations are legislative rules within the meaning of the APA. As such,
these regulations are invalid unless they are promulgated either with notice and
comment or come within the APA's limited exceptions to notice and comment.
A recent case, UnionBanCal v. Commissioner, 305 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2002),
upheld a temporary regulation based on specific Code authority and noted that
Congress "empowered" regulations without notice and comment. According to
the court, the source of the power was the APA and the court quoted 5 U.S.C.
§ 553, the portion of the statute which spells out the exceptions and the disclosure procedures:
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply .. when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.
Id. at 985, n. 50.
As Professor Michael Asimow argued more than a decade ago, the IRS in
promulgating temporary regulations needs to comply with the APA by publishing a detailed explanation of why notice and comment would be impracticable
or contrary to the public interest, and thus why the good cause exception to
notice-and-comment applies. As Professor Asimow explains:
To establish that notice and comment procedure would be "impracticable" or
"contrary to the public interest," the agency must show exigent circumstances.
For example, an imminent implementation deadline imposed by a statute or
judicial decision or an emergency such as a serious public health problem
might qualify as good cause. Similarly, situations in which a statutory purpose
would be thwarted by the absence of immediately-enforceable regulations might
qualify. However, the good cause test is not met simply because an agency

discuss notice and comment suggests it could be important: "The difficulty here is that the Comptroller adopted no expressly articulated position at the administrative level as to the meaning and
impact of the provisions of sections 16 and 21 as they affect bank investment funds. The Comptroller promulgated Regulation 9 without opinion or accompanying statement." Invest. Co. Instit. v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626 (1971).
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wishes to adopt immediately-effective rules to provide guidance or simplify
enforcement. Moreover, claims that an emergency exists are undercut if the
67
agency has waited a substantial period of time before adopting regulations.
As Professor Asimow explains, the standards for the good cause exception would
justify promulgation of temporary regulations intended to prevent transactions
that have come to the attention of the IRS and which the IRS concludes consti6s
tute abuse of the Internal Revenue Code. If, however, the IRS fails to comply
with these APA requirements, a court could and should declare the regulation
69
invalid on procedural grounds.
If, however, this Report's position that all IRS regulations are legislative rules
within the meaning of the APA is rejected, courts may have a difficult time
0
enforcing the "good cause" requirement of the APA. Nonetheless, this Report
recommends that even if it should be determined that the notice and comment
requirements of the APA do not apply generally to temporary tax regulations,
the policies underlying the APA requirement together with the policies that

underlie Chevron deference make it appropriate for a court to give Chevron
deference to temporary regulations only if the IRS in promulgating them can
justify the absence of notice and comment under criteria like that required under
the APA. If the IRS does not provide such a justification, we would recommend
that Skidmore deference be applied since the deliberative process rises at least to
the level of a revenue ruling.
Litigating Regulations.

Regulations issued in response to pending litigation

should be entitled to Chevron deference. Generally, the period a regulation is
outstanding is not relevant, even where a regulation is issued in connection with
pending litigation. This is one issue as to which the case law is clear. See Smiley
v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996); Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. U.S., 115 F.3d

67

Asimow, supranote 29, at 348-49 (footnotes omitted).
'A recent example is T.D. 9062, 68 Fed. Reg. 37,414 (2003), a temporary regulation dealing with
the assumption of partner liabilities in a "Son of BOSS" transaction. It is rare for temporary regulations, which average 39 per year for the last eight years, to rely on good cause.
'The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Hospital Corp. of America v.
Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136, 145 n.3 (6th Cir. 2003), can be read as inviting such a challenge:
"Hospital Corporation does not challenge the temporary regulations [involving section 448(d)(5)] as
violations of the notice and comment requirements for rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 533. Accordingly,
we do not reach the issue of whether the Administrative Procedure Act requires notice and comment
procedures before Treasury may promulgate temporary interpretive regulations that make substantive choices among permissible statutory interpretations."
7
°The IRS could make the following arguments to retain Chevron deference: (1) While temporary
regulations do not receive notice and comment, Mead and Barnhart make clear that notice and
comment is not always required for Chevron deference. (2) By issuing an interpretation as a regulation, the IRS is categorizing the interpretation as one that is made under its delegated powers to issue
rules with the force of law, which is what Mead requires. (3) Temporary regulations receive the
same high level of review as final regulations. (4) Section 7805(e) can be read as a signal that
Congress intended temporary regulations promulgated. after 1988 to have the force of law for three
years.
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430 (7th Cir. 1998); and Barnhart.71 Although NationalMuffler does emphasize
the timing and manner in which a regulation evolved, the Task Force does not
believe that timing should prevent the IRS from changing its view if appropriate
notice-and-comment issuance procedures are followed.
Proposed Regulations. This Report recommends that no deference be accorded to proposed regulations. Although proposed regulations are considered in
depth by the IRS and are treated as "substantial authority" on which taxpayers
may rely to avoid the substantial understatement penalty, I.R.C. § 6662(d),
Notice 1990-20, 1990-1 C.B. 328, we agree with the case law that proposed
regulations should not be afforded any more weight than a position advanced by
the Commissioner in a brief. See General Dynamics v. Commissioner, 108 T.C.
f07, 120 (1997); Laglia v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 894, 897 (1987); Estate of
Brown v. Commissioner, 910 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1999); but see Commissioner v.
Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 228 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (deferring to a
position in proposed regulations).
If, as this Report argues, notice and comment is important and can produce
changes in the content of a regulation, then a proposed regulation that is not yet
subject to notice and comment must be regarded merely as a draft. Accord
Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845 (1986) ("It
goes without saying that a proposed regulation does not represent an agency's
considered interpretation of its statute and that an agency is entitled to consider
alternative interpretations before settling on the view it considers most sound.").
The court in Ravenswood Group v. Fairmont Assoc., 736 F.Supp. 1285, 1288
(S.D.N.Y. 1990), cited Schor with approval in considering the weight of proposed Treasury regulations issued under section 1031. At least.one court believes that this principle remains valid after Mead. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Evans, 254 F.Supp. 434, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing both
Mead and Ravenswood). Indeed the Evans court asserted that an agency cannot
be held to a position set forth in proposed regulations precisely because public
comment could, appropriately, inspire a change in that position. Id. The Task
Force does not believe that Mead mandates any level of deference to proposed
regulations, which, by their very nature, are not meant to reflect law unless and
until they are adopted as final regulations.
As discussed supra, we do recommend deference to temporary regulations in
certain situations. We find this distinction both appropriate and consistent. If the
IRS promulgates a regulation as both proposed and temporary, the agency is
taking the position that the interpretations embodied in the regulation are more
than a draft; they are the current law. Thus, should the IRS desire Chevron
deference, it can issue the regulation as both temporary and proposed, again, so

71

See Part II, Section C, infra.Thus, while earlier tax cases may suggest that a litigating regulation
could be invalidated as an abuse of discretion, such as Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. United States,
453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971), or CaterpillarTractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040 (Ct. Cl.
1978), these cases may have been superceded by developments in Supreme Court precedent.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 57, No. 3

SECTION OF TAXATION

long as the conditions imposed by the APA for promulgating temporary regulations are met.
2. Federal courts should give revenue rulings, certain revenue procedures, and certain notices Skidmore deference, which directs courts
to take into account the agency's experience and its power to persuade, but to retain the ability to choose a better rule even if the
agency interpretation is reasonable.
The Task Force believes that after Mead, some kind of deference is due
revenue rulings as well as those revenue procedures and notices that announce
substantive interpretations of the law. If the tariff classifications in Mead
deserved Skidmore deference, so must these sorts of IRS pronouncements. PostMead case law strongly supports this recommendation.
This Report, like most of the courts that have considered the issue since
Mead, takes the position that Chevron deference is not appropriate for revenue
rulings. 72 First, although issued under the authority of the IRS National Office,
revenue rulings do not have the same force of law as do regulations (whether the
regulations are legislative or interpretive). The IRS's weekly assertion, in its
Internal Revenue Bulletin, that rulings do not have the force and effect of regulations makes that point. 73 Moreover, while regulations normally refer to the
Congressional delegation of rulemaking authority under section 7805 as their
source of authority, revenue rulings cite no such source of rulemaking authority,
but simply refer to the particular Code section being interpreted. This absence is
significant in applying the requirement of Mead that "the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that [Congressional]
authority." As pronouncements claiming less force of law, revenue rulings should
receive less deference than regulations.
Second, as discussed in Section I(E), supra, revenue rulings are not required
to receive the same kind of careful consideration that regulations receive.7 4 Neither the deliberative process nor the level of involvement by top officials is as
extensive for revenue rulings as for regulations. Final regulations require the
signatures of both the Commissioner and the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy;
75
revenue rulings on the other hand, are signed only by the Chief Counsel.
Finally, while not dispositive, revenue rulings are not subject to notice-andcomment.

72
73See

Part II, Section E(2), infra.
See also Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) ("Revenue rulings published in the Bulletin do not have the
force
74 and effect of Treasury Department Regulations.").
1In fact, in 2002 the then-Chief Counsel of the IRS and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy announced plans to streamline the process that produces revenue rulings in order "to move
the guidance more quickly and efficiently." According to news reports, one goal of such an effort is
to "eliminate the effect of too many lawyers trying to perfect the product." Sheryl Stratton, IRS
Looks At Ways To Improve Guidance Process,2002 TAX NoTmS TODAY 205-2 (Oct. 22, 2002).
75
See Chief Counsel Publications Handbook, I.R.M. 30.15.10 (1995).
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Although some revenue rulings (or other guidance, such as notices) may
receive careful review at high levels both within the IRS and Treasury, such
review is not mandated by the IRS's procedural rules.76 In order to develop
policies regarding deference that are consistent and administrable, the degree of
deference needs to vary among categories, not among documents.
It is also arguable that the nature of revenue rulings, unlike the nature of
regulations, does not call for Chevron deference to the IRS. Regulations are
intended to announce rules of general application, affecting many kinds of taxpayers in many kinds of situations. The IRS takes these factors into account in
drafting regulations. Courts reviewing any regulation in the context of a particular case must focus on the impact of a particular regulation on the particular
cases and facts before them and not on whether the regulation makes sense for
the tax system as a whole. Thus, Chevron deference to the IRS's judgment about
regulations of general effect is appropriate. In contrast, "conclusions expressed
in Revenue Rulings will be directly responsive to and limited in scope by the
pivotal facts stated- in the revenue ruling." Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a). Evaluating the application of law to a specific set of facts is well within a court's
competence. Indeed, it is precisely the kind of task that our courts were estab77
lished to perform.
The Task Force reads Mead as mandating that revenue rulings merit Skidmore
deference and that the pre-Mead position of the Tax Court that revenue rulings
merit no deference cannot stand. 78 Thus, a court is free to accept or reject a
position set forth in a revenue ruling on the basis of its evaluation of such factors
as "the degree of the agency's care, its consistency, formality, and relative
expertness, and ...the persuasiveness of the agency's position. ' '79 Mead, 533
U.S. at 228. In the view of the Task Force, the tariff classification rulings at
issue in Mead, which were accorded deference under Skidmore, have less impact 80 and receive less deliberation"' than revenue rulings. In support of accord76

While the Task Force understands that the Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy or other high level
Treasury official may closely review revenue rulings that deal with significant policy issues, other
rulings may receive little or no review at such levels.
77
"Unlike a regulation, which has general applicability, a revenue ruling applies law and policy to
specific facts and particular taxpayers, much as a court decision." SALTZMAN, supra note 45, at
3.02[l]. See Mashaw, supra note 5, for a comparison of the relative institutional competencies of
courts
and agencies.
7
But cf. O'Shaughnesey v. Commissioner, 332 F.3d 1125, 1130 (8th Cir. 2003) ("The Supreme
Court has refrained from deciding whether revenue rulings are entitled to deference.").
79
According to Skidmore itself, "The weight [accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning,
its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140 (quoted in Mead, 533 U.S. at 228).
"°Revenue rulings may be relied upon by all taxpayers where facts and circumstances are substantially similar to those addressed in rulings. In contrast, "Customs has regarded a classification as
conclusive only as between itself and the importer to whom it was issued." Mead, 533 U.S. at 233.
"Revenue rulings are issued only by the IRS National Office. Tariff classification rulings may be
issued by any one of 46 Customs offices. Mead, 533 U.S. at 238. In 2001, the IRS issued 66 revenue
rulings and, in 2002, it issued 99. See supra note 9. In contrast, as noted in Mead, Customs issues
approximately 10,000 tariff classification rulings each year. 533 U.S. at 233.
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ing Skidmore deference to tariff classification rulings, moreover, the Court noted
that the highly detailed regulatory scheme under which the rulings are issued
justifies utilization of Customs' specialized expertise in addressing the subtle
questions presented in the case. 533 U.S. at 235. The same can be said of the tax
code and regulations. The Task Force concludes that revenue rulings should
2
receive Skidmore deference under Mead.1
Revenue procedures and notices, to the extent they address substantive rather
than procedural matters (and are not mere statements of litigating positions),
should receive Skidmore deference for the same reasons. They are issued by the
same IRS office that issues revenue rulings, with similar internal review procedures, and without prior notice and comment. There is little indication that either
Congress or the IRS itself ever intended that revenue procedures or notices
83
would have the same status as regulations.
Interpretations of Ambiguous Regulations. The Task Force believes that
revenue rulings, revenue procedures and similar formal guidance interpreting
ambiguous regulations should receive no more than Skidmore deference. This
recommendation would narrow the doctrine found in Bowles v. Seminole Rock
& Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945), which gives controlling deference to an
agency's interpretation of an ambiguous regulation. 4 Giving interpretations of
regulations the same degree of deference as other interpretations cuts back on
Seminole Rock without completely denying deference to the IRS. Moreover,
giving interpretations of regulations the same kind of deference as other interpretations announced by the IRS in the same format encourages consistency and
ease of administration.
Mead indirectly suggests a diminution of Seminole Rock. Since Mead conditions Chevron deference both on Congress delegating authority to the agency to
issue rules which have the force of law and on the agency interpretation being
promulgated in the exercise of that authority, few, if any, Seminole Rock interpretations of ambiguous regulations would qualify for Chevron deference. Mead
never mentions Seminole Rock and thus fails to reconcile the relationship between Seminole Rock and Chevron as reinterpreted by Mead. Similarly, the
Supreme Court in Cottage Savings v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991),
neither granted deference to the government's interpretation of Regulation section 1.1001-1, nor mentioned Seminole Rock.

82

The Task Force sees no reason to treat revenue rulings issued during the course of litigation
differently. The timing of issuance and the purpose of the ruling (e.g., to bolster the government's
litigating position) would be factors taken into account by the court under Skidmore in determining
the 3persuasiveness of the ruling.
8 Exceptions to this general rule include Revenue Procedure 2003-24, 2003-11 I.R.B. 599, and
Revenue Procedure 2003-25, 2003-11 I.R.B. 601, discussed at text accompanying supra note 41,
which claim to be an extension of a regulation. For all the reasons explained here, the Task Force
believes that even these kind of revenue procedures should be afforded only Skidmore deference.
"See Part II, Section B, infra, for a more detailed discussion of this doctrine.
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In addition, an interpretation of a regulation, if given deference under Seminole Rock, achieves in effect the status of a newly issued regulation. However,
the interpretation may occur many years after the enactment of the underlying
statute. Any deference greater than Skidmore deference thus seems contrary to
the intent of section 7805(b)(1), which prohibits the retroactive application of
85
most regulations.
Like the dissent in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504
(1996),s6 the Task Force is concerned that Seminole Rock permits an end run
around notice and comment and fosters promulgation of ambiguous rules, an
important component of Seminole Rock, but a difficult determination in itself. 7
One scholar has argued that under the separation of powers doctrine inherent in
our constitution, we prohibit lawmakers from intruding on interpreters of the
law. 88 Violation of this principle would occur if Seminole Rock applied to administrative agencies such as the IRS, since the IRS would first write the law
under its congressionally delegated authority and then would interpret it. Even if
such a practice were not a constitutional violation, prudence counsels against
further exacerbating the situation by giving a high level of judicial deference to
these agency interpretations.
3. Federal courts should take into account unofficial agency interpretations, such as private letter rulings, certain notices, technical
advice memoranda, and litigating positions, only to the extent to
which their logic and reasoning appeal to the reviewing court.
Although a difficult decision, the Task Force believes that informal interpretations (such as PLRs) and litigating positions advanced for the first time in
government briefs in which the IRS is a litigant 9 are not entitled to full Skidmore
deference, and should be taken into account by the courts only to the extent to
which their logic and reasoning appeal to or persuade the court. That is, no
deference should be based on the experience of the IRS or attributed to the
complexity of the tax law.

5
Regulations issued within 18 months of a statute, regulations issued to prevent abuse, and
regulations issued to correct procedural defects, are exceptions to the general rule.
6
Justice Thomas wrote in dissent: "It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue
vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater latitude
to make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process.
Nonetheless, agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate
notice concerning the agency's understanding of the law." Thomas Jefferson University, 512 U.S. at
525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
"TWe are particularly concerned that a court might give controlling deference to an interpretation
(without notice and comment) of the most ambiguous of regulations, the ubiquitous anti-abuse or
anti-avoidance regulation.
"See Manning, supra note 1, at 627-44.
9
Agency positions provided in amicus briefs have been afforded Chevron deference. See, e.g.,
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). But cf. Keys v. Barnhart, 347 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2003).
In Keys, Judge Posner wrote "Probably there is little left of Auer."
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Section 6110(k)(3) specifies that "written determinations," 90 including PLRs,
may not be "used or cited as precedent." 91This statutory limitation signals to us
a congressional directive to limit severely the impact of such informal guidance.
This lack of precedential force is bolstered by the disclaimer adopted by the IRS
itself, which appears in every PLR: "Section 61 10(k)(3) provides that it may not
be used or cited as precedent. '92 See, e.g., P.L.R. .2003-28-028 (July 11, 2003);
P.L.R. 2003-32-8034 (July 11, 2003). If taxpayers cannot rely directly on such
documents for guidance, neither should the IRS have the advantage over taxpayers that Skidmore deference might afford.
Mead supports relying on the directive of section 61 10(k)(3). Mead rejects the
reasoning of Justice Scalia's dissent on the grounds that his "efforts to simplify
ultimately run afoul of Congress's indication that different statutes present different reasons for considering respect for the exercise of administrative authority." 533 U.S. at 301. The importance of looking at the statute to determine
Congressional intent appears as well in Mead's discussion of Skidmore deference: "The Court, on the other hand, said nothing in Chevron to eliminate
Skidmore's recognition of various justifications for deference depending on statutory circumstances and agency action." Id. Statutory circumstances in the form
of section 6110(k)(3) call for no deference to written'determinations such as
private letter rulings.
Moreover, these kinds of guidance are directed to individual taxpayers in
particular situations. They are neither rules of general application nor adjudications. Although issued by the IRS National Office and subject to varying degrees of review, these informal interpretations are like litigating positions in that
they. represent the opinion of individual lawyers considering the issue. They do
not receive review and approval by policymakers.
Neither should most notices qualify for full Skidmore deference since they are
little more than an announcement of a litigating position or an announcement of
proposed regulations to be issued. As described below, litigating positions should
receive no deference. Since a proposed regulation receives no deference, a state-

'A "written determination" is a ruling, determination letter, technical advice memorandum, or
"Chief Counsel advice." I.R.C. § 61 10(b)(1)(A). The definition of "Chief Counsel advice" in section
611 0(i)(1)(A) is broad enough to encompass the recent spate of newly fashioned guidance issued to
the field by the Chief Counsel's national office, e.g., field service advice. Accord C.C.A. 2001-46056 (Nov. 16, 2001) (treating field service advice as a "written determination" within the meaning of
section 6110(k)(3) and as without precedential value).
1
Precedent is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) as providing "a basis for determining later cases." Section 61 10(k)(3) also permits the Secretary to establish "by regulation" a rule
which would override the restriction regarding use as precedent. No such rule has been promulgated;
such inaction by the IRS would be relevant under Mead.
'Consistent with this position is Notice CC-2004-012, (Feb. 19, 2004), which sets forth a number
of Q&As dealing with how the Office of Chief Counsel renders legal advice to the field. Question 27
asks whether the written advice represents the "Service position." The answer is "No," because the
Chief Counsel Advice "reflects the analysis and conclusion of a particular office within Chief
Counsel."
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ment anticipating a proposed regulation certainly should not have a higher status. However, there are some notices (e.g., Notice 1998-6, 1998-1 C.B. 337) that
announce substantive rules on which taxpayers may rely, that are issued by the
same high level personnel as are revenue rulings, with essentially the same
deliberative process, and that are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
This combination parallels a revenue ruling and, therefore, this limited category
of notices should obtain the same Skidmore deference as a revenue ruling.
Similarly, positions developed during litigation and not otherwise found in
previously published guidance upon which a taxpayer could have relied should
receive deference only to the extent that their logic and reasoning appeal to a
reviewing court. Such is the rule expressed in Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital,488 U.S. 204 (1988), where the Court stated that "[d]eference to what
appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position would
be entirely inappropriate." 488 U.S. at 213. Mead characterizes Bowen as standing for "near indifference" to an "interpretation advanced for the first time in a
litigation brief." Mead, 533 U.S. at 228. 91
Whether Skidmore deference should be given to an IRS position purporting to
interpret an ambiguous regulation but taken for the first time in litigation is a
particularly difficult issue. As discussed above in connection with the Seminole
Rock doctrine, consistency is desirable for the administration of the tax laws and
thus, any result that would give some litigating positions greater deference than
others should be rejected. Skidmore itself suggests that its rule of deference
applies only to interpretations "that were not of adversary origin." Since the line
between an ambiguous and an unambiguous regulation is so difficult to draw,
we see no reason to provide litigators for the IRS with an advantage that Skidmore
seems to reject.
Moreover, the litigators of the Department of Justice and IRS District Counsel
are not necessarily policy-driven. They receive limited guidance from the policy
makers at the IRS.94 Guidance to the general public should consider broad tax
policy issues. As a matter of sound tax administration, the IRS should be encouraged to write clear regulations and to clarify them in revenue rulings or

93
See also CSI Hydrostatic Testers v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398, affd 62 F.3d. 136 (5th Cir.
1995), discussed in Part II, Section D, infra, which would grant some deference only if the litigating
position was based on an IRS position on which the taxpayer could rely or was a longstanding
position.
'Indeed, a former Chief Counsel of the IRS recently felt the need to issue a memorandum
specifying that Division Counsel must take positions in litigation that are consistent with current IRS
positions set forth in published guidance, including revenue rulings. Chief Counsel Notice 2003-014
(May 28, 2003), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-ccdm/cc-2003-014.pdf (last visited Feb. 24,
2004); Chief Counsel Notice 2002-043 (Oct. 17, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsccdm/pubguid.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). A precursor of this announcement can be found in
Revenue Procedure 1964-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689. The binding nature of IRS regulations and other
guidance with respect to the government is discussed in Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington,
Is the Internal Revenue Service Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAX LAw. 675
(1998).
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regulations as soon as an issue arises. Litigation is not the place to effectively
modify a regulation. The Task Force stands by this recommendation even though
post-Mead, the courts seemed to be split on according Skidmore deference to
certain litigating positions. See Part II, Section E, infra.
Consistent with this recommendation, the Task Force believes that less formal
materials, such as Publications, Forms, and Instructions, should receive no special deference treatment. Thus, courts should take them into account only if the
logic or reasoning stated therein appeals to the court. Similarly, since AODs are
not intended to serve as public guidance, and may not be cited as precedent, they
also should receive no special treatment.
The Task Force does not believe that the Internal Revenue Manual or the
IRS's Statement of Procedural Rules merit any deference whatsoever. These
documents contain internal agency management rules and descriptions of IRS
operations and do not purport to apply to taxpayers except as they might be
incidentally affected by the rules or procedures reflected therein.
In sum, the Task Force believes that federal courts should take into account
unofficial agency interpretations that have no precedential value under
section 61 10(k)(3) and litigating positions adopted in briefs only if the logic and
reasoning stated therein appeal to the court, without deference for the experience
of the agency.95
F. Conclusion
The Task Force believes that this set of recommendations reasonably accommodates both the traditional approach to judicial deference to tax interpretations
and recent Supreme Court developments. It establishes a hierarchy based upon
the authority of an administrative pronouncement and the degree of deliberation
the IRS gives the pronouncement. These recommendations not only honor the
case law, but also present a sufficiently clear cut, and thus workable, set of rules
for courts to apply.

96

PART II: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW
Several sets of cases involving deference to administrative interpretations
establish the backdrop for this Report. These cases fall into the following cat95
The Task Force considered extending "courteous respect" for unofficial agency interpretations,
including litigating positions. Skidmore deference is described as "respect" in both Christensen and
Mead. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000); Mead, 533 U.S. at 235. This is
not surprising, since "respect" is one definition of "deference." In Webster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language (1989), the first meaning of deference is "submission
or yielding to the judgment, opinion, will, etc. of another." This kind of deference takes place when
Chevron applies. The second definition is "respectful or courteous regard." Such is the kind of
deference appropriate where Skidmore applies. This Report avoids the slippery slope created by the
term "respect." In any event, a court presumably treats all participants with respect.
. Of course, the uncertainties of Mead could be eliminated if Congress itself specified the degree
of deference courts should afford to various agency pronouncements, whether specifically for tax
law or more broadly. See Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MIcH. L. REv. (forthcoming
2003) (discussing ways in which Congress could legislate judicial deference, including use of authorization laws, appropriations bills, and omnibus appropriations legislation).
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*egories: Supreme Court cases involving deference to administrative agencies in
general; Supreme Court cases involving deference to administrative interpretations of an agency's own regulations; Supreme Court cases involving deference
to agency litigating positions; Supreme Court cases involving deference to IRS
interpretations; and tax cases in the lower courts.
A. Supreme Court Cases Involving Deference to Administrative Agencies
in General:From Skidmore to Mead
Skidmore. For many years, the Supreme Court adopted a "pragmatic and
contextual" approach to the degree of deference afforded administrative agencies with deference ranging from "great" to "some" to "little," depending upon a
variety of factors. 97 For example, in the classic case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 (1944), which involved a dispute between employees and their
employer over overtime compensation, the Supreme Court considered the degree of deference due an interpretive bulletin and informal rulings of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division of the United States Department of
Labor, which was not a litigant. Those rulings called for excluding sleeping and
eating time from an employee's work week and for including all other on-call
time. The Court observed that, while the Administrator's conclusions were not
binding, "the Administrator's policies are made in pursuance of official duty,
based upon more specialized experience and broader investigations and information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case." 323 U.S. at 139. The
Supreme Court explained:
[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act,
while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute
a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular case
will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of
its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all
those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.
323 U.S. at 140.
The Skidmore test became an important model for judicial review of administrative interpretations. According to Professor Merrill, under Skidmore, "[t]he
default rule was one of independent judicial judgment. Deference to the agency
interpretation was appropriate only if a court could identify some factor or
factors that would supply an affirmative justification for giving special weight to
the agency views."98 That is, application of Skidmore deference is a matter of
judicial discretion; the agency has to earn the court's deference to its view by
satisfying various factors.

97
See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969, 972 (1992).
98

1d.
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Chevron. A decision now almost 20 years old, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), seemed to signal a move away
from Skidmore and to a newly deferential judicial attitude toward administrative
interpretation. Reviewing an EPA air quality regulation, the Supreme Court in
Chevron decreed a two-step analysis:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear .... the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the
precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction
on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous, the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
467 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted).
The Court went on to explain that a "court need not conclude that the agency
construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted to uphold the
construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the question
initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding," id. at 843 n.3, before continuing:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express
delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit: In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.
467 U.S. at 843-44 (citations omitted). Many scholars and lower courts have
viewed Chevron as revolutionary, representing a "profound departure from the
general principle that courts are the primary interpreters of the law"99 and a
"counter-Marbury for the administrative state."' ° Judicial deference, rather than
independent judicial judgment, thus became an important norm. Chevron relied
in part on the democratic pedigree of executive agencies to justify this deference; agencies must answer to the president, to Congress, and thus indirectly to
the voters, for their interpretations of the law.
Since Chevron was decided, however, the Supreme Court has displayed a
great deal of inconsistency about whether Chevron deference under step two' °1

99
Kenneth A. Bamberger, Provisional Precedent: Protecting Flexibility in Administrative
Policymaking, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1272, 1273 (2002).
'°°See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 2075 (1990).
'This Report is focused solely on the deference issues decided under step two of Chevron, which
applies when Congress has not spoken clearly to the issue. The Supreme Court in tax cases has been
able to stop at step one, which involves the "unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." See
Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998), discussed infra. Step one has
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applies to interpretations developed through informal agency decision-making
procedures, such as policy statements, manuals, and opinion letters. Compare
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256-58 (1991) (some but not
Chevron deference to EEOC guidelines) and Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36, 44-45
(1993) (no Chevron deference to Sentencing Commission guideline commentary) with Your Home Visiting Nurse Service v. Shalala, 525 U.S. 449, 452-53
(1999) (Chevron deference to Medicare manual); NationsBank v. VALIC, 513
U.S. 251, 256-57 (1995) (Chevron deference to Comptroller of the Currency
opinion letter); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633,
647-48 (1990) (Chevron deference to opinion letter); and Young v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 978-79 (1986) (Chevron deference to no-action
decision).
Christensen. The Court confronted the problem of deference due informal
guidance in Christensen v. Harris, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). There, it refused to
accord Chevron deference to an opinion letter of the United States Department
of Labor's Wage and Hour Division. The opinion explained that the agency's
interpretation was "contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for
example, a formal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpretations contained in policy
statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the
force of law-do not warrant Chevron-style deference." 529 U.S. at 587. The
opinion continues, "Instead, interpretations contained in formats such as opinion
letters are 'entitled to respect' under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,
323 U.S. 134 ...(1944), but only to the extent that those interpretations have
the 'power to persuade."' Id. The majority opinion does not cite or discuss the
Court's contrary decisions applying Chevron deference to such informal pronouncements. Nowhere does it state that the earlier decisions are no longer good
law. Neither does Christensen indicate which kinds of administrative interpretations, other than notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, are
entitled to Chevron deference and which are not.
Mead: Reinterpreting Chevron. More recently, in United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a tariff classification
ruling issued by the United States Customs Service was not entitled to judicial
deference under Chevron but was "eligible to claim respect according to its
persuasiveness," id. at 221, under Skidmore.

its own set of issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper, but a robust application of step one
may result in many cases never reaching the deference issues inherent in step two. See Elizabeth
Garrett, Step One of Chevron v. National Resources Deference Council, (Third Revised Draft),
prepared for the Scope of Judicial Revision portion of the Project on the Administrative Procedure
Act, June 2001, available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/chevron revised_3.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 2004); Irving Salem & Richard Bress, Agency Deference Under the Judicial Microscope of the Supreme Court, 88 TAX NoTEs (TA) 1257 (2000).
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In a passage of critical importance, the Court held that "administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to
make rules carrying the force of law and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Id. at 226-27. The
opinion continues, "Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of
ways, as by an agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent."
Id. It offers no guidance, however, as what "some other indication" might be.
Thus, Mead refuses to define a bright line rule for application of Chevron.
The opinion rejects the notion that Congress intended administrative action to
be given either Chevron deference or no deference at all. Together, Mead and
Christensen give renewed life to the Skidmore standard, under which the degree
of judicial deference to an administrative interpretation varies, in the language of
Mead, with "the merit of the writer's thoroughness, logic and expertness, its fit
with prior interpretation and any other sources of weight." Mead, 533 U.S. at
235.
Justice Scalia alone dissented in Mead. He predicted that courts will be sorting out the consequences of the Mead doctrine for years to come, that the
principal effect of the majority's decision will be "protracted confusion," and
that Skidmore deference will prove to be "a recipe for uncertainty, unpredictability,
and endless litigation." Id. at 239, 245, 253.
Barnhart. Not long after Mead was decided, the Supreme Court reemphasized in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), that Mead does not require
notice-and-comment rulemaking for Chevron deference to apply. The question
in Barnhartwas whether the Social Security Administration had properly interpreted the language of the Social Security Act to limit eligibility for disability
insurance to those who had demonstrated an inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity for a continuous period of 12 months. Although the agency
had, in fact, recently issued notice-and-comment regulations addressing the interpretive issue, 02 the Court went out of its way to address the role of Chevron
deference with respect to the agency's earlier interpretation to the same effect, as
stated in a ruling, a manual, and a letter:
And the fact that the Agency previously reached its interpretation through
means less formal than "notice and comment" rulemaking ... does not automatically deprive that interpretation of the judicial deference otherwise its due.
...Indeed, Mead pointed to instances in which the Court has applied Chevron
deference to agency interpretations that did not emerge out of notice-and comment-rulemaking.... It indicated that whether a court should give such deference depends in significant part upon the interpretive method used and the
"'The Court also noted that the fact that the regulations had been recently issued, perhaps in
response to the litigation, did not invalidate them or permit the Court to ignore them. Barnhart, 535
U.S. at 221 (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1996). See Part I, Section
E(3), infra, for further discussion of deference to litigating positions.
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nature of the question at issue ....

And it discussed at length why Chevron did

not require deference in the circumstances there present-a discussion that
would have been superfluous had the presence or absence of notice-and-comment rulemaking been dispositive.
535 U.S. at 221-22. The opinion emphasizes that the interpretation was
longstanding and that an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is granted
considerable leeway. It then lists a unique and novel set of factors that call for
Chevron deference to the interpretation at issue: "the interstitial nature of the
legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period
of time." Id. at 522.
Conclusion. The factors listed in Barnhart for Chevron deference bear a
striking similarity to the factors listed in Mead for Skidmore deference and thus
make the choice between the two a difficult and confusing one for lower courts
to make. Nonetheless, Barnhart,Mead, and Christensen force a choice between
Chevron and Skidmore, and that choice is critical. Under Chevron, the IRS may
choose among reasonable alternatives, and the agency will prevail even though
the court or the taxpayer can supply a better reading of the statute. Not so under
Skidmore;103 when the Court in Christensen adopted Skidmore deference, it rejected the agency's view and adopted a view that it thought reflected a better
reading of the statute. Admittedly, Skidmore, with its talk of the agency's specialized experience and broader information, may embody a tilt in favor of the
agency. Under Skidmore, deference to an agency interpretation is tested under
such criteria as consistency, thoroughness, validity of reasoning, or other factors
giving the agency decision the power to persuade. Thus, the power to persuade
under Skidmore may embody more than merely the logical power and consistency of the reasoning. The experience and informed judgment of the administrative agency can also come into play and, as a result, a court's choice between
the position of the taxpayer and the government as litigants may not be the same
as the choice between the arguments of two private parties, although this difference is difficult to quantify or specify precisely. Nonetheless, the courts ultimately determine what the law is under Skidmore. Under the Skidmore doctrine,
a court is free to adopt what it views as the better interpretation of the statute.
As discussed infra, however, the Supreme Court has not relied on step two of
Chevron in tax cases, despite ample opportunity, and this inconsistency makes
the impact of Mead on tax law uncertain. Moreover, even if Mead applies to
require a choice between Skidmore and Chevron, the basis for choosing between
them is also uncertain.
" 3justice Scalia, however, does not read Skidmore in this manner. He writes, for example, "whereas
previously, when agency authority to resolve ambiguity did not exist the court was free to give the
statute what it considered the best interpretation, henceforth the court must supposedly give the
agency view some indeterminate amount of so-called Skidmore deference." Mead, 533 U.S. at 239
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Since Mead, however, tower courts have felt free to substitute their own
views for that of the IRS under Skidmore. See Part II, Section E(3), infra.
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B. Supreme Court Cases Involving Deference to Administrative Interpretations
of an Agency's Own Regulations: Seminole Rock and Its Progeny
Another series of Supreme Court cases addresses the degree of deference that
courts owe to administrative interpretations of an agency's own regulations. The
leading case in this series is Seminole Rock in which the Supreme Court held, in
a dispute regarding the meaning of the words "highest price" in pricing regulations that the Office of Price Administration had issued pursuant to the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, that the interpretation by the agency should
control. Facially, Seminole Rock affords the agency extremely broad authority:
Since this involves an interpretation of an administrative regulation a court
must necessarily look to the administrative construction of the regulation if the
meaning of the words used is in doubt. The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in some situations may be relevant in the first in-

stance in choosing between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is
the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controlling weight unless it

is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.
325 U.S. at 413-14, (emphasis added). The Court did not explain why a court
"must necessarily" look to the administrative construction and cited no authority
' 1°4
for so high a level of deference as "controlling... unless plainly erroneous.
Nor was such a rule necessary in the case since the Court concluded that the
regulation was not ambiguous and "clearly applies to the facts." The Court,
however, may have perceived a need to lay down a broad rule because it was
interpreting not a statute but a pricing regulation and, in such a case, the "only
[interpretative] tools, therefore, are the plain words of the regulation and any
relevant interpretations of the Administrators." Id. at 414.
In Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), the Supreme Court gave Seminole
Rock deference to a clarification of a Department of Labor regulation set forth
for the first time in an amicus brief that was filed at the request of the Court.
Over the petitioner's argument that the Department's interpretation was not
entitled to deference because it came in the form of a legal brief, the Court
asserted that "[t]here is simply no reason to suspect that the interpretation does
not reflect the agency's fair and considered judgment on the matter in question."
519 U.S. at 462. The quotation suggests that when an agency offers an interpretation as an amicus rather than as a party litigant, it is likely to be acting as a
disinterested expert witness and, therefore, there is little risk that the interpretation being advanced was formulated simply to win the litigation. 105
The Court's most detailed statement about deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations came in Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504 (1996), which involved a position of the Secretary of Health and
"'In Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415,430 (1988), the Court made an even stronger statement:
"[Wle are properly hesitant to substitute an alternative reading for the Secretary's unless that alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's
intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation." (emphasis added).
'Of course, the drafters of an amicus brief might well have their eyes on other current or
potential cases involving the agency.
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Human Services, as a litigant, regarding Medicare reimbursement for certain
educational costs incurred by a teaching hospital. The Secretary interpreted its
own regulations as barring reimbursement under the circumstances. With the
help of Seminole Rock deference, the agency's interpretation prevailed, 5 to 4.
The Court wrote:
We must give substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulations. . . . Our task is not to decide which among several competing
interpretations best serves the regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's interpretations must be given "controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. . . . In other words, we must defer to the
Secretary's interpretation unless an "alternative reading is compelled by the
regulation's plain language or by other indications of the Secretary's intent at
the time of the regulation's promulgation.... This broad deference is all the
more warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns "a complex and highly
technical regulatory program," in which the identification and classification of
relevant criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail the exercise
of judgment grounded in policy concerns.
512 U.S. at 512. In the dissent,'Justice Thomas argued that the doctrine unwisely
encourages vague or ambiguous regulations:
It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the agency greater
latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more cumbersome rulemaking process. Nonetheless, agency rules should be clear and definite so that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency's
understanding of the law.
512 U.S. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Scholars have suggested that the rationale for deferring to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is analogous to the rationale supporting Chevron
deference. 0 6 If Congress has delegated power to an agency to fill in legislative
gaps, then courts should defer to any reasonable interpretation that an agency
provides with respect to its own regulations. Because agencies are part of the
executive branch under an elected President, it is more appropriate that an agency,
rather than a court, undertake that function. The power to authoritatively interpret its own regulations may be viewed as a component of an agency's delegated
lawmaking powers.'°7 Moreover, as Chevron explains, an agency can be seen as
"See Manning, supra note 1, at 627-44.
l"TSee Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991). In
Martin, which involved deference to the Department of Labor's interpretation of Occupational
Safety and Health regulations issued by that Department, the Court stated, "Because applying an
agency's regulation to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise
and policymaking prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own
regulations is a component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers." Martin imposes a limitation not suggested in Seminole Rock, however. The agency obtains deference only "so long as its
interpretation 'sensibly conforms to the purpose and wording of the regulations."' 499 U.S. at 15051 (quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter of Izaak Walton League of America,
423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975)).
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having more expertise, and as being more politically accountable, than the courts.
Mead, however, undermines this view of the Seminole Rock doctrine. Since
Mead conditions Chevron deference both on Congress delegating authority to
the agency to issue rules that have the force of law and on the agency interpretation being promulgated in the exercise of that authority, few, if any, interpretations of agency regulations would qualify for Chevron deference. Mead never
mentions Seminole Rock and thus fails to reconcile the relationship between
Seminole Rock and Chevron as reinterpreted by Mead.
C. Supreme Court Cases Involving Deference to Agency LitigatingPositions
Litigating positions that do not involve interpretation of ambiguous regulations present another set of considerations. In Bowen v. Georgetown University
Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988), the Secretary of Health and Human Services
presented a new interpretation of the Medicare Statute in his brief to the Court.
The Court declined to defer to that interpretation, stating that "[d]eference to
what appears to be nothing more than an agency's convenient litigating position
would be entirely inappropriate." 488 U.S. at 213. Accordingly, the Court concluded that courts must not defer to "agency litigating positions that are wholly
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice." Id. at 212.
To the contrary, we have declined to give deference to an agency counsel's
interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no position on
the question, on the ground that "Congress has delegated to the administrative
official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing statutory commands."
Id. (citations omitted).
The Mead opinion characterized Bowen as standing for "near indifference" to
an "interpretation advanced for the first time in a litigation brief." Mead, 533
U.S. at 228. Mead, however, fails to address the question of whether Seminole
Rock or Bowen controls if an interpretation of an ambiguous regulation is first
articulated during litigation.
A different rule applies when an agency promulgates a regulation in direct
response to litigation, rather than merely stating its interpretation in a brief. In
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996), the Supreme Court held that a regulation issued by the Comptroller of the Currency in direct response to litigation
stood on the same footing as any other regulation. While citing no authority for
this position, the Court distinguished regulations from litigating positions under
the following theory:
Of course we deny deference "to agency litigating positions that are wholly
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice,".... But we
have before us here a full-dress regulation, issued by the Comptroller himself
and adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act designed to assure due deliberation .... That it was litigation which disclosed the need for the regulation is irrelevant.
Id.
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The Court in Smiley limited its support for litigating regulations by saying that
some litigating regulations might be arbitrary (and hence invalid) if there were a
sudden and unexpected change in position which "does not take account of
legitimate reliance on prior interpretation." Id. at 742. In the view of the Court,
however, the position taken by the Comptroller of the Currency reflected positions previously taken in interpretive letters and many amicus briefs. Id. at 74243.108

Conclusion. Case law affords no deference to positions developed by litigators
for the first time in briefs. Similarly, positions taken in regulations are given full
Chevron deference, even if a regulation is promulgated in response to pending

litigation.
D. Supreme Court Cases Involving Deference to IRS Interpretations
of the Tax Law

A seemingly separate line of Supreme Court cases addresses deference to
regulations and other interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. In Skidmore
itself, the Supreme Court looked to tax law as a model, observing that it had
"long given considerable and in some cases decisive weight to Treasury Decisions and to interpretive regulations of the Treasury and of other bodies. that
were not of adversary origin." 323 U.S. at 140. Since Skidmore, courts, including the Supreme Court, have generally deferred to tax interpretations so long as
they are "reasonable."
Pre-Chevron Cases. In United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299 (1967), for
example, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation permitting deductions for meals
(as traveling expenses) only if a trip requires a stop for sleep or rest. 10 9 The
Court concluded:

15
SLower courts have deferred to tax regulations directed at a pending controversy. For example,
the insurance industry failed in its attempt to characterize Regulation section 1.809-9 (dealing with
whether a differential earnings rate could be negative) as a "fighting regulation" unworthy of deference. Their argument emphasized that the regulation at issue reflected a reversal of the IRS's
informal ruling position, and that the IRS had announced, four years prior to issuing the regulation,
what the regulation would provide, suggesting that the IRS had "made up its mind" well before, and
with indifference to, the normal deliberative process. The District Court in IndianapolisLife Insurance Co. v. United States, 940 F. Supp. 1370 (S.D. Ind. 1996), thought that Chevron was dispositive
in that the only test was whether the regulation was reasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
ignoring Chevron: "[T]hey would require courts to disregard all federal tax regulations, because the
Treasury is vitally interested in every tax case, and most tax questions sooner or later come to
litigation. Regulation 1.809-9(a) is no worse than most, and better than some." Indianapolis Life Ins.
Co. v. United States, 115 F.3d 430, 436 (7th Cir. 1997). In United Dominion Industries v. Commissioner, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001), the Supreme Court invited the IRS to change its regulation,
agreeing with the IRS that "the Internal Revenue Code vests ample authority in the Treasury to adopt
consolidated return regulations to effect a binding resolution of the question presented in this case."
"~An interpretation to the same effect was first expressed in a 1940 ruling. I.T. 3395, 1940-2 C.B.
64. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, the interpretation had been embodied in a
regulation. See Correll v United States, 369 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1966) (citing Reg. § 1.162-17(b)(3)ii),
(b)(4), (c)(2)).
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Alternatives to the Commissioner's sleep or rest rule are of course available.
Improvements might be imagined. But we do not sit as a committee of revision
to perfect the administration of the tax laws. Congress has delegated to the
Commissioner, not the courts, the task of prescribing "all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C.
§ 7805(a). . . . The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends
with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to
implement the congressional mandate in some-reasonable manner.
389 U.S. at 305. Correll relied in large part on Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S.
79 (1938), perhaps the most significant legislative reenactment case. The Court
saw the issue in Correll as falling squarely within the "settled principle" of
Winmill that "Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes,
are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect of law."
Correll, 389 U.S. at 305 (quoting Winmill, 305 U.S. at 83). The Court continues
to defer to the IRS if it finds a tax regulation "reasonable," and implicit Congressional approval has continued to be important to a finding of reasonableness.
The Supreme Court expanded on the "reasonableness" test in National Muffler Association v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1978). Upholding a denial of tax
exemption for a trade association pursuant to standards prescribed in a regulation under section 501(c)(6), the Court quoted the reasonableness language from
Correll.In language reminiscent of Skidmore, the Court then continued:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional
mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes
with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and' its purpose. A regulation
may have particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction
of the statute by those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If
the regulation dates from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits
inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the regulation has
been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's
interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress had devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.
440 U.S. at 477. The Court concluded that the regulation, although not the only
possible reading of the statutory language, merited "serious deference" under the
factors listed. Id. at 484. The NationalMuffler analysis melds aspects of Skidmore
and Chevron. Like Skidmore, it considers many factors, but like Chevron, it
evidences a high degree of deference to administrative decisions.
Although the Supreme Court has generally adopted this "reasonableness" test
for interpretations of tax law, it has also distinguished between regulations promulgated pursuant to authority granted in a specific substantive provision of the
Internal Revenue Code and those promulgated under the general authority of
section 7805(a), which directs the Secretary of the Treasury "to prescribe all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title." 110 The Supreme
"°As explained supra, in the tax area, regulations promulgated under a grant of regulatory authority in a specific substantive section of the Code are generally referred to as legislative regulations,
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Court wrote in Rowan Cos..v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981), and
reiterated in United States v. Vogel Fertilizer,455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982), that when
a regulation is issued under the general authority of section 7805(a), "we owe
the interpretation less deference than a regulation issued under a specific grant
of authority to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a
statutory provision." With both kinds of regulations, a court defers to the choice
of the IRS among acceptable alternatives. With legislative regulations, acceptability is judged by an "arbitrary and capricious" standard; with interpretive
regulations, the standard is "reasonableness." 1"
Post-Chevron Cases. Without comment, the Supreme Court has adhered to
the reasonableness test of Correll and National Muffler in its tax cases dealing
with interpretive regulations decided since Chevron.I2 For example, in Cottage
Savings, the issue was whether a financial institution realizes tax-deductible
losses when it exchanges its interest in one group of residential mortgage loans
for another lender's interests in a different group of residential mortgage loans.
To answer that question, the Court looked to Regulation section 1.1001-1, which
construed the statutory phrase "disposition of property" in section 1001 as requiring a material difference. The opinion cites both Correll and NationalMuffler in explaining that a court must defer to the Commissioner's regulatory
interpretations of the Code so long as they are reasonable. 499 U.S. at 561. The
opinion quotes the language from Correll quoting the language from Winmill
regarding deemed congressional approval and legal effect of longstanding Treasury regulations and interpretations. Cottage.Savings concluded that the regulation was reasonable because both the statutory language and the IRS requirement of a material difference were longstanding and because the material differand those promulgated under the general authority of section 7805(a) are generally referred to as
interpretive. In other areas of law, regulations promulgated pursuant to language such as that in
section 7805(a) are characterized as legislative regulations because the agency's regulatory authority
derives from an explicit statutory grant. See United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380
(1999); United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990);
but see Merrill & Watts, supra note 24.
"'For an analysis of the components of the arbitrary and capricious review, see Lisa Bressman,
Review of the Exercise of Discretion, ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice
APA Project: Judicial Review drafts, available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/restatement82001.doc (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). Professor Bressman notes that "many cases applying the
arbitrary and capricious test do so to assess the 'reasonableness' of an agency interpretation either as
a part of the Chevron Step Two inquiry or as a separate requirement." Id. at 2.
"2In United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985), the Supreme Court upheld a regulation interpreting the phrase "reasonable cause" in section 6651(a)(1), which excuses a late filing penalty. The
Court stated that the "Service's correlation of 'reasonable cause' with 'ordinary business care and
prudence' is consistent with Congress's intent, and over 40 years of case law as well." Id. at 247 n.4
It concluded that the IRS's interpretation "merits deference." It based the deference grant by citing
Chevron as a mere example: "See, e.g., Chevron.. " This citation suggests that a number of other
cases, such as National Muffler, would produce the same result. Moreover, if the Court were relying
on Chevron, longstanding case law would not be significant. Since all of the other post-Chevron
Supreme Court tax cases clearly do not rely on Chevron (see infra Part II, Section D for a detailed
discussion of the Court's post-Chevron tax decisions), we believe that the timid step-two reference
to Chevron in Boyle suggests that the Court was not prepared in 1985 to shift to Chevron in tax
cases.
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ence requirement was consistent with the Court's own landmark precedent on
realization. The case did not so much as cite Chevron, which had been decided
seven years earlier.
Similarly, United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Company, 532 U.S.
200 (2001), cites Correll, NationalMuffler, and Cottage Savings, but not Chevron, in giving "substantial deference" to the IRS's "steady interpretation" of a
61 year old regulation, which implemented a 62 year old statute. 532 U.S. at
220. Oddly, the Cleveland Indians opinion ignores Seminole Rock as well as
Chevron.113 The Court focused its deference analysis on the longstanding existence of the IRS interpretation at issue and bolstered its position by noting that
the underlying Code section had been reenacted during the life of the administrative interpretation. "Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued
without substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted
statutes, are deemed to have received congressional approval and have the effect
of law." Id. One can only speculate on whether the Court would have granted
"substantial deference" if there had been no supporting legislative reenactment
argument.
The Court has continued to distance itself from Chevron as well as Seminole
Rock in tax cases. In Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v Commissioner, 523 U.S.
382 (1998), the Court did cite Chevron, but it did so only in passing, and only as
to step one. Atlantic Mutual upheld a regulation interpreting the statutory phrase
"reserve strengthening" in a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The
Court first considered the taxpayer's claim that the phrase had a plain meaning
under the statute. It quoted Chevron for the proposition that, if the statute had
the plain meaning claimed, the taxpayer would win because "the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 523 U.S. at 387. The Court, however, determined that neither prior
legislation nor industry use established a plain meaning for "reserve strengthening." Having made that determination, the Court did not, as we might expect,
continue to rely on Chevron. Instead, the Court described its task as deciding
"not whether the Treasury regulation represents the best interpretation of the
statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one," and supported that statement
with a citation to Cottage Savings alone. Id. at 549. Atlantic Mutual, thus, might
be read as adopting Chevron's two step analysis for tax and finding that the
traditional reasonableness test for tax interpretations is applicable in step two of
Chevron.
Most recently, in Boeing Company v. United States, 537 U.S. 437 (2003), the
Court ignored both Chevron and Mead, despite the lower court's reliance on
Chevron in its opinion and the government's reliance on both Chevron and
113

The amount of deference owed to a revenue ruling interpreting a regulation was also at issue in
Cleveland Indians. Rather than citing Seminole Rock for the proposition that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is controlling unless plainly erroneous, the Court reasoned more modestly.
Citing Thomas Jefferson, the Court gave 'substantial deference" to the revenue ruling because it was
longstanding and reasonable. 532 U.S. at 220. See also Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484
(1990) (concluding that revenue rulings are given "considerable weight" if they involve contemporaneous construction of a statute and have been in long use, without citing Chevron).
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Mead in its briefs. In Boeing, the Court upheld Regulation section 1.861-8(e)(3),
which allocates research and development expenses between domestic and foreign sources, as applied to a domestic international sales corporation (DISC) by
virtue of a cross-reference in Regulation section 1.994-1(c)(6)(iii). The Treasury
Department, the opinion explains, could have promulgated a regulation addressing the proper allocation of research and development costs between the parent
and its DISC subsidiary under specific authority delegated to it in section 994,
but instead promulgated the regulation under the general authority of section
7805(a). The Court decided that even if the regulation at issue were regarded as
"interpretive because it was promulgated under section 7805(a)'s general
rulemaking grant rather than pursuant to a specific grant of authority," a court
"must still treat the regulation with deference." 537 U.S. at 448. The opinion
relies solely on Cottage Savings for this proposition.
The Boeing opinion then examined the regulation against the language of the
statute. It found the IRS's position as "surely not arbitrary" and as offering the
virtue of providing consistent treatment for cost items used in computing domestic and foreign income. The opinion considered the arguments of the taxpayer
based on the statutory text and concluded they were "plainly insufficient to
overcome the deference to which the Secretary's interpretation is entitled." Id. at
451. The Court did not apply Skidmore deference under which the agency interpretation must earn judicial respect. Its reasoning assumes that the regulation
was entitled to deference, which, in certain circumstances, could be withheld by
the court.
Conclusion. Readers of the Court's post-Chevron tax opinions are left wondering whether the Court applies a unique analysis when deciding cases involving deference to IRS interpretations of the tax law. The cases leave the relationship between Chevron and NationalMuffler unresolved.
E. Tax Cases in the Lower Courts
The relationship between Chevron and National Muffler has long puzzled
lower courts. In Walton v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 589, 598 (2000), acq., 200344 I.R.B. 964, for example, the Tax Court bemoaned that "the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Chevron failed to cite National Muffler and may have established a different formulation of the standard of review." The Second Circuit has
characterized the choice between Chevron and National Muffler as "unsettled."
General Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 245 F.3d 149, 154 n.8 (2001). In Microsoft
Corp. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 228, 251 (2000), rev'd311 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.
2002), the parties avoided the dilemma by agreeing that National Muffler was
4
the appropriate standard for judging the validity of the regulation. 1
In Rite Aid Corp. v. United States, 255 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2001), an important judicial deference case that invalidated legislative regulations dealing with
Tax Court upheld the regulation, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the regulation
conflicted with the clearly expressed intent of Congress and the plain meaning of the statute.
Microsoft, 311 F.3d at 1189. The Ninth Circuit opinion cites neither Chevron nor Mead.
'The
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consolidated returns, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not apply
the Chevron deference formula. The opinion barely mentions Chevron and makes
no substantive use of it. Rather it cites and relies on Rowan Cos,. Inc. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981), for the proposition that a regulation is contrary
to the statute if "it is outside the scope of authority delegated under the statute."
Rowan, in turn, relied heavily on National Muffler. The government, unhappy
with the approach to judicial deference taken by the Federal Circuit, petitioned
for rehearing and urged the Federal Circuit to adhere to the Chevron formula as
specified by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in another case, Nichols
v. United States, 260 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2001), also involving the consolidated
return regulations. The government's petition for rehearing was denied.
In several cases, as opinions acknowledge, the result would be the same under
either standard." 5 Thus, the distance between a "permissible construction" in
step two of Chevron and a "reasonable" construction in NationalMuffler might
be negligible. 1 6 But in some cases, including those involving changes in policy,
the standard used could lead to different results, as Justice Scalia argued in his
Mead dissent." 7 Chevron itself involved a change in an EPA interpretation that
reflected a change in administration, and thus of environmental policy. Chevron
taught courts to bless such changes as part of our democratic process. A changed
interpretation, however, would be neither contemporaneous nor longstanding,
and would not have been relied on. Thus, it might not merit deference under
National Muffler.
While the Supreme Court has not felt it necessary to apply Chevron analysis
or the Mead framework to tax cases, many lower courts have felt obliged to do
so. As discussed below, the post-Meadcases involving administrative interpretations of the tax law-whether in the form of regulations, revenue rulings, or less
formal guidance-underscore the confusion both about whether Mead applies to
tax law and about what Mead means if it does.

"'See Walton, 115 T.C. at 598 ("In the case before us, we conclude that it is unnecessary to parse
the semantics of the two tests [Chevron and NationalMuffler] to discern any substantive difference
between them, because the result here would be the same under either.")
" The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed in Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 973, 981-82 (7th Cir 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 961 (1998), "While the
two approaches articulate the level of deference differently, they both come down to one operative
concept-reasonableness. Thus, Chevron and the traditional rule constitute two different formulations of a reasonableness test." In Snap-Drape, Inc. v, Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 821 (1997), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit cited Chevron as
the standard for legislative regulations as well as language from Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 252 (1981), articulating the National Muffler standard-harmonization "with the plain
language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose"-for interpretive regulations. Snap-Drape, 98
F.3d at 197.
"'Justice Scalia noted that when it comes to changes in agency interpretation, Chevron and
Skidmore take diametrically opposing views-Chevron requiring deference to the new position as
within the authority of the Executive Branch, while Skidmore does not. See 533 U.S. at 247 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). In this regard, National Muffler, with its attention to whether an interpretation is
"longstanding," seems to be an heir of Skidmore.
"8 'he discussion that follows considers lower court tax cases through the end of 2003.
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1. Regulations
Traditionally, cases involving legislative regulations and cases involving interpretive regulations both cite National Muffler at the same time that courts
afford interpretive regulations less deference than legislative regulations.119 Lower
courts applying Chevron to interpretive regulations have struggled to sort out
whether Chevron increased the level of deference traditionally given to interpretive regulations under National Muffler. For example, in People's Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Commissioner, 948 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991), the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's invalidation of
an interpretive regulation and chided the Tax Court for ignoring Chevron. According to the Sixth Circuit, interpretive regulations reflect an implicit legislative delegation of authority to the IRS, requiring deference under Chevron, a
level of deference which the Sixth Circuit believed to be greater than that under
National Muffler. 948 F.2d at 300.
Mead forces lower courts to consider whether the Supreme Court has now
directed them to decrease the level of deference given interpretive regulations.
As discussed earlier, the IRS takes the position that regulations promulgated
under section 7805(a) are not binding rules under section 553(b) of the APA,
and Mead requires that interpretations be announced with the force of law in
order to partake of Chevron deference. Thus, courts must ask whether Mead has
changed the level of deference owed to such regulations from the traditional
standard of National Muffler to a lower standard under Skidmore.
Some courts have read Mead as not calling for a change in the standard for
deference to regulations. In Tax Analysts v. IRS, 215 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D.D.C.
2002), rev'd 350 F.3d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 2003),12 ° the court upheld Regulation
section 301.6110-1(a), which interprets the phrase "written determinations under
*Section 6110" of the Code. Id. at 195. It concluded that the interpretation in the
regulation was entitled to Chevron deference under Mead because it was a
reasonable interpretation adopted "in a formal rulemaking process." Id. at 198.
The opinion made no mention of whether the regulation was legislative or interpretive. Similarly, in Marsh & McClennan v. United States, 302 F.3d 1369 (Fed.
Cir. 2002), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld Regulation
section 301.6611-1(h), interpreting "due date" in connection with accrual of
interest on overpayments. Under Chevron and Mead, it looked to the regulation,
which it found reasonable, to resolve the statutory ambiguity. Id. at 1375-76.
While the opinion discusses at length why the interpretation was reasonable, it
does not discuss at all the regulation's status as either legislative or interpretive.
The Tax Court's reconsideration of Redlark v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 31
(1996), in Robinson v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 44 (2002), illustrates the dilemma courts face. In Redlark, the Tax Court had invalidated Temporary Regulation section 1.163T-8 and -9. Those regulations, which were promulgated
. 9 See Aprill, supra note 30, at 60.
2
' The District Court analyzed the case under step two of Chevron; the Court of Appeals, in
contrast, saw it as a step one case.
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pursuant to section 7805(a), denied noncorporate taxpayers a deduction for interest on federal income tax deficiencies, even if the interest related to their businesses. The Tax Court, having found itself reversed by the Courts of Appeals for
the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits on the issue, revisited the question
in Robinson. In an exhaustive analysis, citing not only Chevron, but also Vogel
Fertilizer, Correll, Atlantic Mutual, National Muffler, and Cottage Savings, a
majority of the Tax Court concluded that the statute was silent or ambiguous and
that the regulation, therefore, was a permissible construction of the statute.
Five judges dissented. The dissents of both Judge Swift and Judge Vasquez
discuss Mead. Judge Vasquez, joined by four other judges, wrote at length about
the impact of Mead. He objected to the way in which the majority applied
Chevron under pre-Mead case law because, in his mind, Mead narrowed the
reach of Chevron. He concluded that, under Mead, the regulations were not
entitled to Chevron deference because they were not issued pursuant to a "spe'
cific congressional delegation of authority having the force and effect of law,"121
i.e., because the regulations were issued pursuant to section 7805(a). 119 T.C. at
119-20. As a result, "the fact that a court pre-Mead found the agency's position
to be reasonable under the Chevron standard is insufficient." Id. at 118. Having
asserted that the majority was wrong in giving the regulation Chevron deference,
Judge Vasquez tested the regulation's persuasiveness under Skidmore, and found
it lacking, primarily because of its reliance on nonauthoritative Joint Committee
on Taxation materials. Id. at 120-2 1.
Temporary Regulations. Robinson also raises the question of what degree of
deference is owed to temporary regulations, post-Mead. Prior to Mead, courts
generally did not distinguish between temporary and final regulations. Thus,
temporary regulations were entitled to deference if they met the same tests
applicable to final regulations. See, e.g., E. Norman Peterson Marital Trust v.
Commissioner, 78 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The fact that the regulation
at issue is a temporary regulation does not change our analysis. Until the passage
of final regulations, temporary regulations are entitled to the same weight we
accord to final regulations."); cf.Kikalos v. Commissioner, 190 F.3d 791, 796
(7th Cir. 1999) (declining to decide the degree of deference that temporary
regulations command because both parties had assumed that full Chevron deference was warranted).
In New York Football Giants v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 152 (2001), which
was decided after Mead, the Tax Court followed the pre-Mead cases and held
that Temporary Regulation section 301.6245-IT was valid. As a legislative regulation promulgated pursuant to a specific grant of authority in section 6245, the
'For discussions by commentators who agree with this analysis, see John F. Coverdale, Chevron's
Reduced Domain: Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations and Revenue Rulings After Mead, 55
ADMIN. L. REv. 39 (2003) (agreeing that interpretive regulations are entitled only to Skidmore
deference post-Mead); Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 EAL PRop.,
PROB. & TRUST J. 731 (2002); Merrill & Watts, supra note 24. Robinson was decided, and the articles
were published, before the Supreme Court's decision in Boeing, which appears to use the special
criteria for deference to regulations developed in tax cases.
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court reasoned that it was entitled to greater deference than an interpretive
regulation and, under Chevron, could be overturned only if arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statue. The opinion cited Mead's holding for guidance as to when Chevron applies. Thus, the opinion, after Chevron and Mead,
gives Chevron deference to a temporary legislative regulation, because it views
the regulation as promulgated in the exercise of Treasury's delegated authority.
In UnionBanCal Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached
very much the same conclusion, although it did so solely on the basis of Chevron, and without citation to Mead. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument
regarding Temporary Regulation section 1.267(f)-lT(c)(6), governing the recognition of losses in a controlled group. The taxpayer argued, inter alia, that no
deference to the regulation was required because it was promulgated without
notice and comment. The Preamble to the regulations, 22 without explanation,
stated that notice and comment was "impractical" because of "a need for immediate guidance." The court relied on Chevron, the APA, and the express delegation of authority in section 267 that losses not be recognized "until such time as
may be prescribed in regulations" to reject the taxpayer's challenge.
The courts' analyses in New York Football Giants and UnionBanCal,however, are inconsistent with some readings of Mead. In his dissenting opinion in
Robinson, for example, Judge Vasquez argued that Mead changed the traditional
analysis. In a footnote, he took the position that in light of Mead, the temporary
regulation at issue was not entitled to Chevron deference because it "did not go
through notice and comment. 1 23 Robinson, 119 T.C. at 120 n.6 (Vasquez, J.,
dissenting). Judge Vasquez believes that after Mead, "Chevron deference is
reserved for only those agency interpretations reached through notice-and-comment or comparable formal administrative procedures." Id. at 117. If failure to
undergo notice and comment precludes deference under Chevron as expounded
by Mead, then temporary regulations do not merit Chevron deference.
However, courts of appeals reviewing temporary Treasury regulations after
Mead have emphasized the statement in Mead that Chevron deference does not
require notice and comment. 124 Thus, in Hospital Corporation of America v.
Commissioner, 348 F.3d 136 (6th Cir. 2003), the Sixth Circuit quoted Mead
before upholding Regulation section 1.448-2T, which addresses treatment of
expected uncollectible receivables following a change to the accrual method of
accounting:
The temporary regulations involved in this case were arrived at centrally by the
Treasury Department after careful consideration. They were issued pursuant to
statutory authority to 'prescribe' needful rules and regulations. See I.R.C.
249 Fed. Reg. 46,992 (1984).
' Judge Vasquez's opinion also notes that "there is no evidence that it went through formal
administrative procedures, and it remains in temporary form 15 years later." 119 T.C. at 120 n.6.
Under current law, temporary regulations expire after three years. I.R.C. § 7805(e)(2).
24
' The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina reached the same conclusion for a
temporary legislative regulation in Volvo Trucks North America v. United States, No. Civ.
1:01CV00416, 2003 WL 223421 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2003).
23
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§ 7805(a). The regulation was 'interpretive' in the same sense that the regulation in Chevron was interpretive-it gave content to ambiguous statutory terms.
Congress clearly intended that the Treasury Department do so, and Chevron
deference is therefore appropriate. 12
Similarly, in reviewing the same temporary regulation as that at issue in
Robinson, the Fifth Circuit in Alfaro v. Commissioner, 349 F.3d 225 (5th Cir.
2003), rejected the argument that issuance of the regulation without notice and
comment eliminates Chevron deference. It upheld the regulation, citing to
Robinson itself, to the five federal courts of appeals that upheld the regulation
prior to the Mead decision, as well as to Chevron and Mead.
Thus, while some judges and commentators have read Mead as reducing the
deference courts give to either interpretive or temporary regulations from Chevron to Skidmore, recent decisions from the courts of appeals have found temporary regulations to be entitled to Chevron deference. Failure of the IRS to provide notice and comment did not change the level of deference to the regulation.
2. Revenue Rulings and Revenue Procedures
Mead has also complicated the calibration of judicial deference due to revenue rulings, official interpretations by the IRS that are published in the Internal
Revenue Bulletin as the IRS's legal conclusions based on stated facts. The Tax
Court has traditionally afforded revenue rulings no deference whatsoever, while
the federal appellate courts have varied in the amount of deference afforded to
revenue rulings. 126 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Mead, comparing trade and tax matters, observed that "[c]ustoms' classifications rulings are
in some ways an even less formalized body of interpretations than IRS revenue
rulings." Mead v. United States, 185 F.3d 1304, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1999). If,
according to the Supreme Court in Mead, tariff classifications deserve Skidmore
deference, it is unclear whether the more formalized body of interpretations
represented by revenue rulings requires the higher deference of Chevron or
whether they merit application only of Skidmore, perhaps with consideration of
additional, or different, factors. Courts since Mead have had to grapple with that
question.
These cases have taken a variety of approaches to the weight due to revenue
rulings. To some courts, the open-ended language in Mead allows for the possibility that revenue rulings should receive Chevron deference. 127 For example, in
a footnote in American Mutual Life Assurance Co. v. United States, 267 F.3d
1344, 1353 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2001), the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit left
for another day the question of whether revenue rulings are entitled to Chevron
deference under the standards of Mead.
"ZHospitalCorp., 348 F.3d at 144-45. As noted earlier, see supra note 69, the Sixth Circuit
observed that the regulation was not challenged for failure to undertake notice and comment.
' 26See Galler, supranote 10.
27
' One court did conclude, but only briefly, that under Mead, revenue rulings are entitled to
Chevron deference. In Ammex, Inc. v. United States, No. 00-CV-73388, 2002 WL 32065583 (E.D.
Mich. July 31, 2002), the court wrote:
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A recent Ninth Circuit opinion reads Mead as directing lower courts to increase the weight given revenue rulings, albeit not to the degree of Chevron
deference. In Omohundro v. United States, 300 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2001), the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit unambiguously concluded that the "Supreme Court decision in Mead... requires that we accord Skidmore deference to
revenue rulings." 300 F.3d at 1069. As a result, the court overruled a 1994 case,
Miller v. United States, 38 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1994), in which the court held that
a taxpayer must file an income tax return within two years of payment of the
taxes in order to recover a refund or credit. In reaching its conclusion, the court
in Miller relied on certain language in the statute, as well as on the need to
prevent forum shopping, but did not discuss or consider Revenue Ruling 1976511, 1976-2 C.B. 482 (1976), which permitted a three-year limit on filing for
refund. In light of Mead, however, Omohundro applied the Skidmore test to the
ruling, and found the reasoning to be valid, consistent with later IRS pronouncements, and supported by the legislative history of section 6511. As a result, the
Ninth Circuit held that a claim for credit or refund is timely if filed within three
years from the date the income tax return is filed, regardless of when the return
is filed.
In Aeroquip-Vickers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 347 F.3d 173 (6th Cir. 2003), the
court of appeals engaged in a lengthy discussion concluding that in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions, its position that revenue rulings deserve Chevron deference required reconsideration. It concluded that, under Mead, revenue
rulings merited only Skidmore deference. In the case before it, it decided that
consideration of various Skidmore factors called for some deference to the applicable revenue ruling, Revenue Ruling 1982-20, 1982-1 C.B. 6, which involved
recapture of investment tax credits with respect to intercompany transactions
that were part of a planned transfer outside of the consolidated group. The Sixth
Circuit also concluded that the Tax Court mischaracterized the degree of deference to be given to revenue rulings by failing to acknowledge explicitly that
some deference is due to them. The lengthy dissent agreed with the majority
[T]he Supreme Court in Mead held a ruling could receive Chevron deference even if it was
not specifically authorized by Congress and even if it did not go through the rigors of the
APA .... In applying the Mead test to revenue rulings, it is clear that Congress delegated
to the IRS the authority to make determinations having the force of law, e.g., rules and
regulations pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(a). A revenue ruling promulgated by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary under the express authority of § 7805 represents a
formal interpretive rule. Therefore, after Mead, revenue rulings should be considered as
controlling precedent unless shown to be arbitrary or capricious.
The judge later reversed his position, see Ammex, Inc. v. United States, No. 00-CV-73388, 2002
WL 31777584 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 22, 2002 ), in light of The Limited v. Commissioner, 286 F.3d 324
(6th Cir. 2002). In The Limited, the Sixth Circuit described revenue rulings as "typically the IRS's
response to a hypothetical situation and as such ... authoritative and binding on the IRS" but not
binding on courts because they are "interpretive rulings by an administrative agency that do not
require notice and comment." The Limited, 286 F.3d at 337. The Sixth Circuit relied on its own preMead precedents in reaching its conclusion. Id. It cited only one Supreme Court case, United States
v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200 (2001), noting in a parenthetical that there the
Supreme Court refrained from deciding the level of deference due revenue rulings, but gave the
particular revenue ruling at issue "substantial judicial deference" because it reflected the IRS's
longstanding interpretation of its own regulations. Id. at 338.
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about the importance of Mead and that Skidmore deference applied to revenue
rulings, but disagreed as to what Skidmore deference entails. According to the
dissent, Skidmore deference is not an automatic deference to interpretive authority because Skidmore deference requires "persuasive reasoning" by the administrative agency. The dissent did not find the reasoning of Revenue Ruling 198220 persuasive.
In several other cases, courts have commented that, in light of Mead, revenue
rulings merit some consideration, albeit not Chevron deference. In Vons Companies, Inc. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 1 (2001), the Court of Federal Claims
reiterated its view, in a discovery order, that revenue rulings are not binding
precedent, but do require consideration. 51 Fed. Cl. at 8. In a footnote, the order
suggests that Mead and other recent Supreme Court cases call into question any
decisions that give revenue rulings the force of precedent under Chevron. Id. at
8n.5.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner, 332 F.3d 1125 (8th Cir. 2003), declined to defer to Revenue Ruling
1974-491, 1974-2 C.B. 290, which ruled that molten tin used in the manufacture
of glass did not qualify as depreciable property. Although the IRS argued that
Mead called for deference to the revenue ruling, the Court of Appeals looked
primarily to Cleveland Indians as authority. It concluded that the revenue ruling
before it, unlike the revenue ruling in Cleveland Indians, did not represent a
longstanding consistent interpretation of an unchanged statute. The 1974 ruling
involving the tin predated substantial changes to the depreciation system, had
not been tested in the courts, and was not subsequently reconsidered by the IRS.
As a result, "the district court did not err in declining to treat revenue ruling 74491 as controlling or persuasive authority."
Mead has also influenced the Tax Court's attitude toward revenue rulings. In
Lunsford v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 159 (2001), Judge Halpern's concurring
opinion acknowledges that the Tax Court has taken the view that revenue rulings
receive no deference because they are merely opinions of a lawyer in the agency,
but it also refers to Mead, in a "but see" citation, "for a discussion of the
deference, but less than Chevron deference, owed to certain agency interpretations of a statute." 117 T.C. at 174 n.6 (Halpem, J., concurring). In Tedokon v.
Commissioner, 84 T.C.M. (CCH) 657, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-308, the Tax
Court quoted the Ninth Circuit's discussion of Mead and Skidmore in Omohundro,
and wrote, "Rev. Rul. 76-511, 1976-2 C.B. 428, likewise commands deference
and is applicable to this case, since the fact pattern is the same.' ' 28 In Medical
Emergency Care Associates v. Commissioner, 120 T.C. 436 (2003), the Tax
Court declined to defer to a revenue ruling, but did so only after a discussion of
Mead and Mead's invocation of Skidmore and only after concluding that "we are
unable to ascertain the thoroughness of the agency's consideration or the validity of its reasoning." Id. at 445.
"2Nonetheless, it may be that the statement simply reflects the application of the rule, in Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), since the Ninth Circuit is the court to which Tedokon would be
appealed. Two other recent Tax Court cases observe that revenue rulings, although entitled to
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Thus, a consensus seems to be emerging to give some -weight to revenue
rulings under Skidmore. Giving revenue rulings Skidmore deference would require some courts to increase the deference afforded revenue rulings, and others
to decrease it. If Mead's approach does apply to tax law, Mead's invocation of
Skidmore for tariff rulings undermines the Tax Court's traditional refusal to
grant any deference to revenue rulings. As the case review above demonstrates,
several judges, although not yet the Tax Court as a whole, assume that Mead
does apply to administrative interpretations of the tax law in the form of revenue
rulings.
Unlike revenue rulings, revenue procedures are rarely involved in deference
disputes. This is in all likelihood because revenue procedures were meant to
reflect merely internal procedures of the IRS that are published because they
might affect taxpayers' rights or duties. Most litigation involving the weight of
revenue procedures has arisen in contexts. in which taxpayers attempted to invalidate an IRS action on the basis that the agency had not followed a revenue
procedure. There is, therefore, a substantial body of case law holding that revenue procedures do not have the force and effect of law and that the IRS itself is
not bound by them. See, e.g., Estate of Shapiro v. Commissioner, 111 F.3d 1010,
1017 (2d Cir. 1997) (and cases cited therein); United States v. Toyota of Visalia,
772 F. Supp. 481, 486 (E.D. Cal. 1991), aff d, 988 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1993).
Among the reasons offered in support of these conclusions are that revenue
procedures are procedural rules, in contrast to revenue rulings, which involve
substantive tax law, Estate of Shapiro, 111 F.3d at 1017, and that revenue
procedures do not require approval from the Secretary of the Treasury, Boulez v.
Commissioner, 810 F.2d 209, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In at least one case since Mead, the IRS argued that revenue procedures are
entitled to Chevron deference. Citing Mead, however, the court in Fannie Mae,
56 Fed. Cl. 228, 234-35 (2003), held that revenue procedures are entitled to
deference under Skidmore, not Chevron. The court called attention to the preface
in each issue of the Internal Revenue Bulletin to the effect that revenue procedures "do not have the force and effect of Treasury Department Regulations,"
which merit deference under the Chevron standard.
Despite the IRS's own description of revenue procedures as matters of procedure, and the courts' adoption of that characterization, revenue procedures often
affect substantive rights. It might be argued therefore, that the standard of deference owed to revenue procedures should vary, depending upon whether a particular document is truly procedural rather than substantive. In other words, if a
revenue procedure goes beyond mere procedure, perhaps it should be treated the
same as a revenue ruling or substantive notice. Indeed, the court in FannieMae
explicitly left aside the question of whether the revenue procedure at issue in
consideration, are not precedent, and cite as authority nothing more recent than Dixon v. United
States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965). See Crow v. Commissioner, 2002 T.C.M. (RIA) 2002-178; Kirshenbaum
v. Commissioner, T.C. Summ. Op. 2002-152 (Nov. 25, 2002). In another recent case, Rauenhorst v.
Commissioner, 119 T.C. 157 (2002), the Tax Court reiterated its view that revenue rulings are not
binding on the Tax Court or on other federal courts, and that the Tax Court could "in the appropriate
case" disregard a ruling as inconsistent with its interpretation of the law. 119 T.C. at 173.
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that case was truly procedural rather than substantive, reasoning that "[n]o statutory interpretation function is ascribed to revenue procedures." Id. at 235. On
that basis, the court concluded that judicial decisions regarding deference to
revenue rulings were of limited utility.
Post-Mead, the lower courts have taken inconsistent approaches with respect
to revenue rulings and revenue procedures. While that may be due, at least in
part, to the varying approaches taken by the courts prior to Mead, the courts are
no closer to developing a consistent standard even with the help of the Mead
decision. Although the language of Mead leaves open the possibility of Chevron
deference for revenue rulings and revenue procedures, the fact that they are
issued without notice and comment suggests that Chevron deference should
apply only in exceptional circumstances. Mead's reliance on Skidmore for tariff
rulings, moreover, implies that Skidmore should apply to revenue rulings and
revenue procedures that address substantive, rather than procedural, matters.
3. Informal Guidance,Notices and Litigating Positions
Just as some judges have speculated that Mead calls for Skidmore deference
to revenue rulings, so have other judges wondered whether Mead requires them
to give Skidmore deference to the IRS's informal guidance and litigating positions, including briefs. As with revenue rulings, such a level of deference represents increased deference for some courts and decreased deference for others. In
addition, this category of agency pronouncements evidences particular confusion regarding the Seminole Rock line of cases.
Despite all of the regulations issued by the IRS, many of which inevitably
contain ambiguities, the Seminole Rock line of cases has seldom been applied in
tax disputes. One notable tax case in which a court did so is United States v.
Wisconsin Power and Light Co., 38 F.3d 329 (7th Cir. 1998). A general counsel
memorandum and a revenue ruling supported the IRS's interpretation of its
regulation. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit upheld the IRS interpretation, relying on both Seminole Rock and Davis v. United States, 495 U.S.
472 (1990). Similarly, in Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 177 F.3d 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1003 (1999), the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit found it unimportant that the IRS's interpretation
of a regulation was offered for the first time during that particular controversy.
What mattered to the court was that the interpretation involved a regulation;
thus, "[b]ecause the interpretation advanced by the IRS is neither inconsistent
with any prior interpretation of these regulations nor incompatible with their
plain text," the court deferred to the interpretation. 177 F.3d at 146.
In contrast, the court in CSI Hydrostatic Testers v. Commissioner, 62 F.3d
136 (5th Cir. 1995), applied Bowen to reject an IRS litigating position interpreting the consolidated return regulations. In order for an interpretation to merit
deference, the Court of Appeals required more than an "administrative practice,"
although a longstanding pre-litigation administrative practice might be sufficient. 62 F.3d at 136. The Fifth Circuit's one paragraph per curiam opinion
explicitly endorsed the opinion of the Tax Court in the case, which had noted the
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general rule of Seminole Rock that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference, but concluded that "in the absence of a contrary
published, or at least longstanding, interpretation of the regulation in question,
deference is not the rule." CSI Hydrostatic Testers v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
398, 408-09 (1994). The Tax Court opinion continued, "[U]nless an agency's
interpretation of a statute or a regulation is a matter of public record and is an
interpretation on which the public is entitled to rely when planning their affairs,
it will not be accorded any special deference." 103 T.C. at 409.
One recent case, decided after Christensen and before Mead, applied Auer in
the context of an IRS notice that interpreted an ambiguous regulation. In Esden
v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit considered the method for calculating benefits due to participants
electing to receive accrued pension benefits in lump sum pursuant to a cash
balance pension plan. The statute and regulations had been written for traditional
defined benefit plans, however, not cash balance plans, and the issue in the case
was how those regulations should apply to cash balance plans. The court held
that Notice 1996-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, which provided guidance on exactly the
issue presented, was entitled to deference under Seminole Rock because it interpreted the agency's own regulations. Citing Auer and Justice Scalia's concurring
opinion in Christensen as well as Seminole Rock itself, the court stated that the
notice was entitled to deference regardless of its form of publication.129 Deference to an IRS interpretation of its own regulations, according to the court, did
not require the formality of a regulation or revenue ruling.
Cases decided since Mead demonstrate considerable inconsistency as to which
line of Supreme Court cases should govern the degree of deference due a litigating position. In Landmark Legal Foundation v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132 (D.C. Cir.
2001), the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that, under Mead,
interpretations developed in litigation now call for Skidmore deference, rather
than the Chevron deference that it had applied in an earlier case involving the'
same provision of the Code. In light of Mead, the court wrote, "we must decide
for ourselves the best reading." The court examined the phrase "data ... received by . . . the Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the
determination of the existence, or possible existence, of liability" in section
6013(b)(2)(A), which defines "return information" for purposes of confidentiality and disclosure. The Court decided against the taxpayer, but on the basis of its
own evaluation under Skidmore rather than on the basis of deference to the
government's interpretation. It rejected the position argued by the government in
its brief that the Court should defer to the IRS under Seminole Rock.
In Tax and Accounting Software v. United States, 301 F.3d 1254 (10th Cir.
2002), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also looked to Skidmore to
gauge the level of deference to an IRS interpretation, although it did so on the
basis of Christensen without citing Mead.130 The Tenth Circuit declined to defer
"'In a footnote, the court stated that even if the notice were not entitled to "Chevron-style
deference" under Christensen, it would still be "entitled to respect" under Skidmore. Esden, 229 F.3d
at 169 n.19.
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to the government's interpretation of two of the statutory requirements for the
research and development credit of section 41(d)(1): "discovering information"
and "process of experimentation." Although a set of regulations regarding this
code section had become final in January 2001, and a new set of proposed
regulations was issued in December of 2001, there were no final regulations that
had gone through notice and comment at the time the case began, and the court
concluded that the government's position, therefore, was due respect only under
Skidmore.
While the government's position regarding discovery of information had been
consistent in litigation regarding section 41 (d)(1), its position changed as regulations were developed. Under Skidmore, according to the Tenth Circuit, such
inconsistency in its litigating position ruled out substantial deference. For the
discovery requirement, the Tenth Circuit read the plain language of the statute as
mandating that the taxpayer "show that he discovered new information and that
the information be separate from the product that is actually developed," Tax
and Accounting Software, 301 F.3d at 1262, a different standard from that argued by the government. As for the meaning of "process of experimentation,"
the opinion determined that because the government had either taken no position
or altered its position, its interpretation was entitled to "little deference" under
Skidmore. The Court undertook its own examination of the legislative history. It
concluded the research credit did require initial uncertainty as to the feasibility
of the final result and that the taxpayer, as a matter of law, could not meet that
requirement.
In U.S. Freightways Corp. v. Commissioner, 270 F.3d. 1137 (7th Cir. 2001),
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit also rejected an IRS interpretation,
in this instance of the meaning of the requirement in Regulation sections 1.263(a)2 and 1.461-1(a)(2), that benefits extending "substantially" beyond the tax year
had to be capitalized. The IRS, through litigating positions in other cases, and in
-the way that it had applied the rules in different cases, treated the word "substantially" as covering any time period extending more than a few days or perhaps a
month. The court looked to Mead and the factors of Skidmore to determine the
degree of deference owed this characterization. Like Justice Scalia's dissent in
Mead, the court feared that full Chevron deference to informal interpretations
would encourage boot strapping: "With full Chevron deference, agencies could
pass broad or vague regulations through notice-and-comment procedure, and
then proceed to create rules through ad hoc interpretations that were subject to
only limited judicial review." 270 F.3d at 1142. The Seventh Circuit found that
the position of the IRS in revenue rulings and in other cases evidenced no
consistent practice, and that the IRS's policy, as demonstrated in examples from
the applicable regulations, favored the taxpayer. The court went through this
examination of consistency, as directed by Skidmore, before rejecting the
government's position.
"3According to one of the lawyers in the case, the case was briefed before the decision in Mead.
Telephone call by Irving Salem to Rebecca Fowler (Oct. 23, 2002).
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In Matz v. Household InternationalTax Reduction Investment Plan, 265 F.3d
572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 954 (2002), where the IRS was an
amicus rather than a litigant, the outcome also turned on the level of deference
to be given the government. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in this
case reversed its earlier decision, 227 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2000), which the Supreme Court had vacated and remanded in light of Mead. The court had to
decide whether both vested and non-vested participants, or only non-vested
participants, should be counted in determining whether a partial termination of a
retirement plan has occurred. In the first opinion, the Seventh Circuit had, pursuant to Chevron, deferred to the IRS's position offered in its amicus brief, that
both categories should be counted. On remand, the Court, applying Skidmore,
rejected the IRS interpretation, and held that only non-vested participants should
be counted. It reasoned that the IRS's position in the amicus brief was an
informal agency policy pronouncement not entitled to Chevron deference. 265
F.3d at 574. It wrote, "We do not believe that a position set forth in an amicus
brief, supported by some Revenue Rulings and an agency manual are formal
enough to warrant Chevron treatment." Id. at 575. Moreover, the court asserted,
"Upon reading Mead, we find that a litigation position in an amicus brief,
perhaps just as agency interpretations of statutes contained in formats such as
opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement guidelines
•.. are entitled to respect only to the extent that those interpretations have the
power to persuade under Skidmore." Id.
The IRS's position in its amicus brief did not persuade under Skidmore. Since
the statutory language was ambiguous, the regulations not helpful, the statutory
framework without assistance, and the legislative history without guidance, the
court fell back to the purpose of the statute, which was to protect employees'
legitimate expectations of pension benefits, and, on that ground, rejected the IRS
interpretation. Thus, Matz rejected the IRS interpretation only'after at least claiming to have afforded it Skidmore deference. The opinion noted that Mead quoted
language from Skidmore to the effect that "an agency's interpretation may merit
some deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience and broader
investigation and information' available to the agency." 265 F.3d at 574 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139)). For the court,
the quotation from Mead regarding "whatever its form" appears to indicate that
even litigating positions merit some deference under Skidmore. Neither Mead
nor Matz quoted the language from Skidmore specifying that weight be given to
interpretations of governmental agencies "that were not of adversary origin,"
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139, to consider whether it implied that -interpretations
that were of adversary origin are owed little or no deference. 3 '
1

'The Seventh Circuit in the Keys case recently concluded that the, post-Mead brief.of the Social
Security Administration did not have the force of law and was entitled to "limited deference."' The
court analogized the government's brief to an "opinion letter," which under Christensen does "not
warrant Chevron-style deference." Keys, 347 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Christensen, 529
U.S. at 587). The Seventh Circuit also questioned the continuing vitality of Aver post-Mead. See
supranote 89.
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The post-Mead cases involving informal IRS actions demonstrate vividly the
tension between Mead's invocation of Skidmore and the rule of Seminole Rock
and Auer that courts must give controlling weight to reasonable administrativeagency interpretations of their own regulations and rules. This tension is exemplified in American Express v. United States, 262 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001), in
which the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that the IRS, relying on
a general counsel memorandum, properly construed the term "services" in Revenue Procedure 1971-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, to deny American Express the ability
to use the ratable inclusion method for income received annually from cardholders.
The issue in the case involved the IRS's interpretation of an ambiguous term in
its own revenue procedure, and, according to the court, "substantial deference is
paid to an agency's interpretation reflected in informal rulings." 262 F.3d at
1383. The opinion cites Mead and Christensen only for the propositions that the
revenue procedure was "plainly statutorily authorized," id. at 1380, and that the
interpretation of the revenue procedure in the general counsel memorandum was
"not reflected in a regulation adopted after notice-and-comment and would probably not be entitled to Chevron deference. Id. at 1382. It relied for its holding on
the authority of Auer and Cleveland Indians rather than using the factors of
Skidmore as directed by Mead.
Matz, in contrast, saw Mead as requiring reliance on Skidmore instead of Auer
and its progeny when it came to judicial deference to informal interpretations. In
its list of citations, the opinion used a "compare" cite to introduce Auer and
Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 427 (7th Cir. 1997), in
which the court had deferred to interpretations in agency amicus briefs because
the interpretations were not post hoc rationalizations and reflected the agency's
fair and considered judgment. The Matz court found such precedents not to be
binding in the post-Mead case before it.
As Matz and American Express demonstrate, it is difficult to reconcile Seminole RocklAuer and Skidmore/Mead. Mead directs courts to impose the procedural deference of Skidmore to certain informal interpretations. Seminole Rock
and Auer instruct that, at least when it comes to the agency's informal interpretations of its own ambiguous regulations, a more substantial deference is due.
Mead neither limits nor endorses the Seminole RocklAuer line of cases. No
language in the majority opinion in Mead responds to Justice Scalia's concern
about deference to informal rulings interpreting ambiguous or broadly worded
regulations. 132

132

If both Seminole Rock and Mead are good law, revenue rulings, revenue procedures, or litigating positions that interpret regulations receive greater deference than other kinds of revenue rulings
or revenue procedures, which, for example, might merely interpret statutory language alone. Yet,
insofar as Skidmore deference under Mead and Christensen turns at least in part on the degree of
consideration the agency gives to formulating it interpretations, the regulations and procedures of the
IRS make no distinctions based on the content or context of revenue rulings or revenue procedures.
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F. Conclusion
The case law, from both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts,
reflects many uncertainties and inconsistencies-whether Chevron or National
Muffler supplies the standard for tax law; whether or when Chevron or Skidmore
applies; the extent to which legislative and interpretive tax regulations should be
judged differently; whether Seminole Rock has continuing viability; and how
informal IRS guidance and litigating positions should be treated. While this
confusion is unfortunate, it offers the challenge and opportunity to set a course
that is most likely to lead to the best possible administration of the tax laws.
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